Prejudice
Subtitled: Japanese-Americans: Symbol of Racial Intolerance, 1944
This 1944 book on the subject of what led up to the internment of persons of Japanese ancestry is probably the best single book I have read the subject from the time.
It starts off talking about the California-Japanese War, referring to the troublesome relations between the two areas from 1900 through 1941. It goes on to being the most in-depth, most sensible examination of the problem I have yet seen.
Introduction
This section talks about the persons of Japanese ancestry being put into “protective custody.” This is one of the arguments used for why the interment was done - to protest the PJAs from attacks by Americans angry about the war.
Theoretically, with the PJAs gone from the West Coast, anger against the Japanese should have gone down, but the exact opposite happened.
“..after evacuation had been affected, the nation noted, rather to its amazement, that agitation against persons of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast noticeably increased.”
“What had been a small flame of race prejudice became a raging fire.
Agitation on the West Coast for the removal of the Japanese was
as nothing compared to the agitation that developed, after their
removal, to prevent their return! "As the danger of an invasion
of the West Coast receded, measures were taken against this
minority which no one had advocated prior to their removal.”
“Citizens of Japanese ancestry have been subjected to measures which were deemed unnecessary even in the case of German and Italian
nationals; and these measures have been imposed without charges,
hearings, or due process of law.”
The argument that has been given against putting Germans and Italians into internment camps was that they had already been assimilated into American culture. The PJAs not only had not been assimilated, but they looked different than whites.
The argument, though, has a couple of problems. First, many Americans belonged to a group called the Bund, which was a pro-Nazi group. German spies actually landed on the East Coast. So there was just as much danger from whites as from Asians.
Secondly, having the PJAs all looked alike (to some degree, anyhow), actually would make it harder for them to be spies or saboteurs since they would stand out in a crowd. It'd be like having a person seven tall in a group of people of normal height. Makes it easy to identify the person and to follow him.
“The charge was frequently raised in California, for example, that Japan was attempting a "bloodless conquest" of the West Coast and the absorption of Hawaii by "seepage." The evidence indicates, however,
that the initial immigration of Japanese to Hawaii and the West Coast was not planned or instigated by Japan.”/p>
Basically, some people though the Japanese had immigrated to the U.S. and planned to have so many children they would out-reproduce the whites and thus take over the West Coast. Sounds stupid, but that's what I've seen in some sources from the time.
The reason the Japanese came to Hawaii and the West Coast was that jobs were available and were advertised by persons in Hawaii and on the West Coast.
“ It was after this immigration had reached sizable proportions
that Japan discovered that anti-Oriental agitation on the West
Coast could be used for a variety of purposes: as a smoke screen
for Japanese aggression in Asia; as a means of inflaming Japanese
public opinion against America; as the excuse for ever-increasing
military and naval appropriations; as an excellent issue to exploit
for domestic political purposes inside Japan; as a quid pro quo
in dealings with the United States; and as a means of diverting
widespread social discontent in Japan into chauvinistic channels.”
“ It is part of my purpose, in this volume, to show that military
cliques in Japan began, nearly fifty years ago, to lay the foundation
for the acceptance, by the Japanese people, of the idea of
an eventual war against the United States...”
What the author is saying is that certain elements in Japan had been considering the possibility of war with the U.S. for a long time, and that they took advantage on the problems on the West Coast for their own purposes.
“It will be noted that the moment we admitted a large number of Japanese immigrants as permanent residents, while refusing to make it possible for them to become citizens, we had in effect created a situation which Japan could exploit to great effect for the purposes indicated.”
By refusing to allow the Issei, the first generation, to become American citizens, we gave the militaristic element in Japan a means for their own propaganda.
“These same cliques in Japan were not interested in racial
equality: they were at all times interested in imperialistic aggrandizement. They used the issue on the West Coast to make
us appear, in the eyes of all Orientals, as race bigots and hypocrites.”
OF course, there were many people on the West Coast who were exactly that; racial bigots and hypocrites.
“A comparison of the racial creed of the West Coast on
the Japanese with the racial orthodoxy of the Deep South will
reveal the existence of the same fallacies, stereotypes, and myths.”
This is the only book of all the ones I've looked at from the times that draws a direct comparison between the racial prejudice against blacks and the racial prejudice against the PJAs.
“I also propose to show that the main reason the federal government
permitted the West Coast to dictate important aspects
of our Far Eastern policy was that, as a nation, we had not yet
concluded the unfinished business of the Civil War.”
This is a perfect example of the fact that those who do not learn from history and doomed to repeat it.
The author goes on to show how politicians from the South basically helped those from the West Coast.
“Whenever the West Coast racial creed was seriously challenged in Congress, or when the spokesmen for this creed were proposing new aggressions, representatives from the Deep South quickly rallied to their defense.”
The California-Japanese War (1900-1941)
“For nearly fifty years prior to December 7, 1941, a state of
undeclared war existed between California and Japan.”
" Every man, woman and child in Japan," wrote Louis Seibold, "knows a great deal more about California than he does about the United States. . . . California is anathema to the average Japanese, and when he talks of war against the United States, he really means California." On at least one occasion, Japan even threatened to take action against California "as an independent nation."
This is very serious stuff. Now, I'm not saying that if this hadn't happened then Japan wouldn't have been involved in WWII. I think that was almost inevitable, but some fifty years of bad feeling probably did have some effect overall.
“The first overt act, so to speak, in the California-Japanese War
occurred in March, 1900, when Mayor James D. Phelan of San
Francisco, using some idle gossip about an alleged "bubonic
plague" as an excuse, quarantined both the Chinese and the Japanese
sections of the city. The local Japanese immediately protested,
claiming that the order was motivated by political
considerations and that its effect was to put them out of business.”
This is not something I have read about elsewhere (as I said, this book is VERY in-depth.) What better way to shut down the businesses of people you don't like than to quarantine the entire section of the city that they are located in?
This action, of course, had consequences.
“To protect their interests, they proceeded to form the
"Japanese Association of America."”
This, of course, is a very reasonable and understandable action.
For, but every action, there can be an opposite, and sometimes unequal, reaction:
“As a result of this flurry of
excitement, the first anti-Japanese mass meeting was called in
San Francisco on May 7, 1900. The meeting was sponsored by
the San Francisco Labor Council; the chief speaker was Dr.
Edward Alsworth Ross, professor of sociology at Stanford University.
Repeating the stock arguments that had been developed
against the Chinese, Dr. Ross found the Japanese objectionable
on four counts:”
1. They were unassimilable.
2. They worked for low wages and thereby undermined the
existing labor standards of American workmen.
3. Their standards of living were much lower than those
of American workmen.
4. They lacked a proper political feeling for American
democratic institutions.
In the San Francisco Call of May 8, 1900, Dr. Ross was quoted
as having said that "should the worst come to the worst it would
be better for us to turn our guns on every vessel bringing Japanese
to our shores rather than to permit them to land.”
The meeting proposed an extension to the Chinese Exclusion Act, to also ban Japanese. Japan, trying to defuse the situation, announced that “no further passports would be issued to contract laborers seeking to enter the United States.” This led to a 50% decrease in immigration.
The problem is that there are some types of people that are determined to have their own way, no matter what, and nothing that is done is enough to satisfy them.
“This conciliatory action, however, failed to abate popular
feeling in California. At the 1901 convention of the Chinese
Exclusion League and at the 1904 convention of the American
Federation of Labor, resolutions were passed asking Congress
to exclude further Japanese immigration.”
The next step of this undeclared war was when the San Francisco Chronicle decided to run anti-Japanese articles with lurid headlikes like:
1. Crime and Poverty Go Hand in Hand with Asiatic Labor
2. Brown Men are an Evil in the Public Schools
3. Japanese: A Menace to American Women.
And then, there's my favorite weird-out headline of all time:
“Brown Asiatics Steal Brains of Whites.”
The series of articles ran through February and March of 1905. Media headlines like this can exert pressure on the “low information” voters, and have results.
Asiatic Exclusion League
“Following the appearance of the Chronicle articles, the California
legislature, on March 1, 1905, by a vote of twenty-eight
to nothing in the Senate and seventy to nothing in the Assembly,
passed a resolution urging Congress to exclude the Japanese.
Two months later, the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League
was formed in San Francisco. Within a year, this organization
had a membership of 78,500 (three fourths of its membership
being located in the San Francisco Bay area). By 1905 the fight
had been narrowed down to the Japanese. "The Chinese," the
Chronicle observed, "are faithful laborers and do not buy land.
The Japanese are unfaithful laborers and do buy land."
The Japanese and Korean Exclusion League shortly thereafter became the Asiatic Exclusion League.
According to the author, a powerful trade-union movement was a major force behind the anti-Oriental agitation. The author points out that most of the leaders of that movement were Irish.
Another organization that was anti-Oriental was the Songs of the Golden West, which was created in 1875. It got involved in the anti-Oriental movement after 1907. The organization also believed that a “grave mistake” had been made in granting citizenship to blacks after the Civil War.
Equal-opportunity haters.
It also caused them to take some unusual stands.
“It opposed the Child Labor Amendment upon the extraordinary ground that the white American farmer must be free to work his children in the field in order to meet the competition of Japanese labor. It opposed our entrance into the League of Nations out of a deep-seated
fear that Japan would bring the issue of racial equality before the
League. It has consistently opposed the admission of Hawaii as a
state, because of its large population of Oriental ancestry.”
The author also points out that, until Pearl Harbor, Southern California was not really as involved in the race hatred as the other parts of the state.
Then came the San Francisco Earthquake of 1906. The Japanese government sent $250,000 to help the relief effort.
Normally, of someone helps you, you thank them. In this case, though, since the Japanese community took part in the rebuilding and opened new stores, the Asiatic Exclusion League called for a boycott of all Japanese establishments. Two “distinguished” visitors from Japan were assaulted.
The author also talks about the school board incident, where the San Francisco school board tried to make all the Japanese students in the city attend a special Oriental-only school. The author points out that much of this was done to distract public attention from some very bad corruption that was going on in the government of the time.
President Teddy Roosevelt condemned the action of the school board. A hearing that resulted in the Metcalf Report (Dec. 18, 1906) found that there was “no factual justification for the action of the school board.” One result of the board's action was 19 cases of serious assaults against Japanese residents of the city.
The author again refers to the way the South supported this racism.
" Because of their Negro problem, southerners
were in sympathy with San Francisco's views; southern
congressmen as a whole were decidedly with California in her
race struggle." Congressman Burnett of Alabama stated that "we
have suffered enough already from one race question" and similar
views were echoed by Senator Bacon of Georgia, Senator Tillman
of South Carolina, Senator Underwood of Alabama, Senator Burgess
of Texas, and Senator Williams of Mississippi. One Congressman
from Mississippi stated: "I stand with the State of California in opposition to mixed schools. [Applause] I stand with Californians in favor of the proposition that we want a homogeneous and assimilable
population of white people in the Republic."
None of this was helped along by public speakers.
“Throughout this period, Captain Richmond P. Hobson
was conducting an inflammatory anti-Japanese campaign, on the
lecture platform, in Congress (1907-1915), and in the press. "We
know," he wrote, "that the Japanese in California are soldiers
organized into companies, regiments, and brigades."
He was telling blatant lies, and people were falling for them.
In 1907, the President stopped immigration by way of Hawaii, Canada or Mexico. The response? Mobs began to assault the Japanese in the city, and Japan had a harsh reaction, putting it close to declaring war against the U.S. France offered to act as a mediator.
Things got even worse:
“Attention was momentarily diverted from the situation in
California when, on September 7, 1907, serious anti-Japanese
riots broke out in Vancouver; but on October 14 another riot
took place in San Francisco. The New York Times of September
29, 1907, carried a story about Japanese designs on the Philippines;
the New York Tribune published a serial story depicting
war between the United States and Japan, and the New York
Sun announced that war was "inevitable." The campaign
reached such proportions that President Roosevelt publicly denounced
"the wanton levity, brutality and jingoism of certain
California mob leaders and certain yellow journals."
One way to do things is to try and determine the facts of a situation. How to do that? Appoint a special commission.
“...the California legislature in 1909 appropriated funds
for a general investigation of the Japanese in agriculture. When
the report, prepared by the State Labor Commissioner, was submitted
in May, 1910, the legislature was horrified to discover
that it was quite favorable to the Japanese. "The Japanese land
owners," read a portion of the report, "are of the best class.
They are steady and industrious, and from their earnings purchase
land of low value and poor quality. The care lavished upon
this land is remarkable, and frequently its acreage value has increased several hundred per cent in a year's time. Most of the
proprietors indicate an intention to make the section in which they
have located a permanent home, and adopt American customs and
manners."
So, there you have it, politicians. The facts. So, how do politicians react to facts?
“Senator Caminetti (Commissioner General of Immigration
in the Wilson administration) immediately proposed the
following resolution which was quickly adopted:
Whereas, the State Labor Commissioner has in his report
concerning Japanese laborers, expressed his opinion of the
necessity of such laborers in this state, and thus without
authority misrepresented the wishes of the people of this
commonwealth, therefore, be it Resolved, that the opinion
of such Labor Commissioner is hereby disapproved by this
Senate.”
So, if you don't like the report, say that the special commission just didn't reflect how people really felt. Facts, who needs them?
And the rumors just kept on coming:
“In 1911 it was widely reported in this country with thrilling
details, that Japan was taking steps to secure from Mexico
a naval base at Magdalena Bay, in Lower California.
This had followed a report in 1910 that the Japanese had
sunk our drydock Dewey in Manila Bay, after planting
mines which imperiled our navy at the station. They had
also secretly charted our California harbors. Then there were
numerous plottings with Mexico for a position from which
this country could be attacked. A combination with Germany
to destroy the Monroe Doctrine was the pabulum
served up to the American public in 1912. In the same year
Japan was forming an alliance with the West Coast Indians
to gain a military foothold in this country. In 1915 Japanese
spies were seen in the Panama fortifications and in the next
year Japan was found conspiring to get a foothold in Panama
by getting control of tie San Bias Indian lands. Japan's
diplomats penned Carranza's protests against our invasion
of Mexico, after there had been landed in that country two
hundred thousand Japanese troops, who had already fired on
American troops at Mazadan.”
The Magdalena Bay one I've seen in other places. The wildest one is the one where the Japanese were supposedly conspiring with Native Americans.
One would think a President of the United States would try to speak reasonably, but Woodrow Wilson thought differently.
"The whole question is one of assimilation of
diverse races. We cannot make a homogeneous population of a
people who do not blend with the Caucasian race."
The Yellow Peril
The term “Yellow Peril” has been used a lot, but its origin involved European politics.
“The first formulation of the doctrine itself was made in 1893 by C. H. Pearson in a book entitled National Life and Character. After conjuring up the horrible spectre of the yellow races sweeping over Europe...”
Stereotypes
Another thing people have been familiar with is the stereotype of the bucktoothed, bespectacled, odd-speaking Japanese. Interesting enough, the origin of these things goes back to a magazine series.
“Not only had a firm ideological basis been laid for anti-Japanese
feeling by 1909, but malicious stereotypes were being created
which tended to solidify anti-Japanese sentiment. From the schoolboard incident in San Francisco, Wallace Irwin received the inspiration for his popular fiction about the Japanese schoolboy,
Hashimura Togo.First published in Collier's in 1907, these
letters long enjoyed considerable popularity on the West Coast.
In them the "Jap" stereotype was clearly outlined: the bucktoothed,
bespectacled, tricky, wordy, arrogant, dishonest figure
of the comic strips and pulp magazines. It was Mr. Irwin who
invented the stereotyped speech of the Japanese-American or
"Jap." It was Mr. Irwin who coined all the funny parodies on
the use of Japanese honorifics, such as "Honorable Sir," and the
"so sorry, please."
Discrimination is made Legal
“One of the first measures proposed in the January, 1913, session
of the California legislature was the so-called Webb-Heney
Bill or Alien Land Act. Previously all such proposals had been
aimed at aliens in general; but these earlier proposals had encountered the strong opposition of important landowning corporations controlled by British capital. This particular measure,
however, was ingeniously drafted: it was aimed not at aliens
generally, but at "aliens ineligible to citizenship."
The bill passed 35-2 in the California Senate, and 72-3 in the Assembly. This caused a very harsh reaction in Japan.
“Members of Parliament invoked the old jio (anti-foreign spirit), advocated a policy of yakiuchi (incendiarism), and invited the people to burn the American embassy.”
The Japanese Try to Make Nice
“Later in 1913 the Japanese government sent a mission to this
country to "allay the bitter feelings of the Japanese in California."
42 Mr. J. Soyeda, a member of this commission, subsequently
published a report entitled Survey of the Japanese Question
in California, In this report he took occasion to urge the
Japanese in California to assimilate. He urged them to abandon
those customs and habits which set them apart from other residents
and to act the part of good citizens, even though they were
ineligible to citizenship.”
The San Francisco Examiner published a rather nasty reply.
Land Owners
The author also goes into the subject of land ownership and land speculation, and how monopolies had been developed that didn't like the Japanese horning in on their territory.
The Hearst Papers Stike Again
“The attack was launched by an elaborate piece which appeared
in the New York American, and other Hearst newspapers, on September
28, 1915, entitled: "Japan Plans to Invade and Conquer
the United States Revealed by Its Own Bernhardi." The article
purported to be a translation of a book published in Japan by
"the Japanese Military Association." It was illustrated by pictures
purporting to show Japanese troops practising landing operations
preparatory to an assault on the California coast. Investigation
revealed that: (a) the purported translators could not be located
or identified; (b) the pictures were retouched illustrations used
during the Sino-Japanese War of 1895; (c) the original story
published in Japan had been a "dream story" of the pulp
magazine variety which had sold about 3000 copies instead
of the 500,000 copies represented; and (d) that the text had been
distorted in translation.”
Again, truthfulness in reporting was not exactly a top priority of the Hearst papers (nor, actually, of many papers and TV and internet organizations in today's world.)
AS song called a “Hymn of Hate” was written, one stanza going this way:
“They've battleships, they say,
On Magdalena Bay!
Uncle Sam, won't you listen when we warn you?
They meet us with a smile
But they're working all the while,
And they're waiting just to steal our California!
So just keep your eyes on Togo,
With his pockets full of maps,
For we've found out we can't trust the Japs!”
Another Paper
A guy named V.S> McClatchy was editor and publisher of the Sacramento Bee newspaper, and he became deeply involved in the anti-Japanese movement, starting up the California Joint Immigration Committee in September of 1919.
After WWI
After WWI ended, “a wave of anti-Japanese agitation swept California.” This was due, the author says, to Japanese actions in Korea, Siberia, China and Shantung.
Labor became involved.
“The Federated Trades Council
of Sacramento, on September 10, 1920, passed a resolution condemning
anti-Japanese "propaganda now being spread by designing
parties to the detriment of labor." In 1916 the American
Federation of Labor failed, for the first time in years, to pass
an anti-Oriental resolution.”
Part of the reaction slightly later involved the Presidential election campaign for 1919/1920.
“In point of virulence, the 1920 agitation far exceeded any
similar demonstration in California. In support of the initiative
measures, the American Legion exhibited a motion picture
throughout the state entitled "Shadows of the West." All the
charges ever made against the Japanese were enacted in this film.
The film showed a mysterious room fitted with wireless apparatus
by which "a head Japanese ticked out prices which controlled
a state-wide vegetable market"; spies darted in and out of the
scenes*; Japanese were shown dumping vegetables into the harbor
to maintain high prices; two white girls were abducted by a
group of Japanese men only to be rescued, at the last moment,
by a squad of American Legionnaires. When meetings were called
to protest the exhibition of this scurrilous film, the meetings were
broken up.”
“Two influential novels appeared which were planned as part
of the campaign: Seed of the Sun (1921) by Wallace Irwin and
The Pride of Palomar (1921) by Peter B. Kyne.”
In relation to Kyne's novel:
“Here are some of the charges made against the Japanese in
Mr. Kyne's novel: their manners are abominable; they are greedy,
selfish, calculating, quarrelsome, suspicious, crafty, irritable, and
unreliable; they have no sense of sportsmanship, no affection for
their wives, and they have never shown the slightest nobility or
generosity of spirit.”
One side-effect of all of this was growing hatred against other grups, including Armenians, Turks, Greeks and Hindus.
Alien Land Laws
“The Alien Land Act, passed as an initiative measure in 1920,
was represented as the "final solution" to the Japanese problem;
as designed to eliminate every "loophole" in the 1913 statute.
Following its adoption in California, much the same statute was
adopted in Washington, Oregon, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware,
Nebraska, Texas, Idaho, and New Mexico.”
What is really interesting about this list is that it's not just West Coast states. Delaware on the East Coast is represented, and some states slightly east of the West Coast states are included.
The author then examines who might have profited from all of this.
1. Landowners did not profit: they had to accept lower rentals.
2. Agricultural workers did not profit: their wages declined and kept declining.
3. Non-Japanese produce growers did not profit, since produce growing got more organized and other areas of the country began to compete with products grown in California.
4. The general public did not benefit since prices went up. The Japanese had grown crops and sold them cheaper than the white growers.
Legal Measures
1. Takao Ozawa case, involving the Supreme Court. The ruling was that the student was not a “free white person” and therefore was not eligible to become a citizen.
2. The Quota Immigration Act of 1924.
“In 1935, 1937, and 1939, various anti-Japanese
measures were introduced in the California legislature; in 1934
mobs assaulted the Japanese in Arizona; and in the spring of 1935
the Hearst press began to inveigh against "inequitable Oriental
competition sapping the economic life of America and retarding
recovery." At the same time, a mysterious Committee of
One Thousand was formed in Southern California. It began to
repeat in its publication, the American Defender, the familiar
calumnies: Japanese truck-gardeners were spraying their vegetables
with arsenic; using human excrement as fertilizer, thereby
creating epidemics of "bacillary dysentery"; they were training
an army in Peru, and so forth. Typical of its utterances was this
passage from the issue of April 27, 1935: Wherever the Japanese have settled, their nests pollute the communities like the running sores of leprosy. They exist like the yellowed, smoldering discarded butts in an over-full ashtray, vilifying the air with their loathsome
smells, filling all who have misfortune to look upon them
with a wholesome disgust and a desire to wash.”
The West Coast Japanese
The author notes that the people in California did not take into consideration that the first-generation of Japanese were immigrants, without a command of the language or culture. Their sons and daughters, though, were becoming assimilated. If WWII had not started for another ten years, the author says, then the internment might not have happened at all since, by that time, the second generation would have been fairly well assimilated on well on their way to a third generation.
Most of the original immigrants, the author says, were Japanese farmers and farm laborers. Some of them were from the eta (burakumin) group of outcasts.
In 1909, they made up 41.9% of the agricultural labor supply in California.
The author than examines Japanese culture, noting the importance of family to them, the lack of intermarriage, and a willingness to put in the long hours needed to grow crops successfully.
“Their most important contribution to the economy of the
West, however, was the manner in which they organized produce
production on a year-round basis so as to provide a steady flow
of produce to the markets.”
Why was this important? This was a time before homes had refrigerators like they do today. You couldn't buy produce and then freeze it for later. Everything needed to be as fresh as you could get it, unless you were into canning things yourself. So having crops available year round, rather than in just certain seasons, was good for the consumer and good for the farmer.
The author then examines the state of California and its population, noting that the state itself had not achieved full immigration, that it was still sort of on the wild side, and they were using similar “stay-out” methods on farmers from Oklahoma and other places.
Another thing the author talks about that no one else does is Japanese grocery stores. They catered to the Japanese tastes, particularly those of the Issei, or first-generation, for a long time. This kept them totally apart from white-owned groceries. Once the Nisei began to grow up, though, and start buying things themselves, then the stores began to modify to reflect more American-type things since the Nisei were become more “Americanized.” This then put these Japanese-owned stores in direct competition with white-owned stores, and that itself caused trouble.
The Issei
“No immigrant group ever made a more determined effort to
succeed in America than did the Japanese^;The reports of the
Immigration Commission consistently paid tribute to their eagerness
to adjust themselves to their new environment. The progress
of the Japanese, reads one report, "is due to their greater eagerness
to learn, which has overcome more obstacles than have been
encountered by most other races, obstacles of prejudice, of
segregation, and wide differences in language." At the outset,
they showed a remarkable willingness to adopt American folk-
ways; to adopt American clothes, habits, furnishings, and even
religious practices. They conducted themselves with admirable
fortitude in the face of a bigoted opposition. There was no
crime problem among them (a remarkable fact for an immigrant
group); they paid their debts; they supported their own indigents.
They conducted good-citizenship campaigns; they organized
special campaigns against prostitution and gambling.
When objections were made to the type of homes in which
they lived, they organized Better Homes and Gardens campaigns.
When objections were raised to the language schools, they took
the initiative in suggesting that these schools be regulated or
that the Japanese language be taught in the public schools. When
objection was raised on the issue of dual citizenship, they asked
the Japanese government to liberalize its expatriation laws.”
In other words, they did about everything they could to try and get along.
The Supreme Court decision of 1923 (Japanese were ineligible for citizenship) caused the Issei to lose faith that they would ever truly fit in. What was worse for them was the way their children gradually adopted American ways and didn't follow the traditional ways any more.
One of the problems for the Nisei, though, was after they got out of college. They were effectively blocked from many occupations due to discrimination.
Exodus from the West Coast
The American military had no plans at all for anything like the forced internment of PJAs. The author tends to forget, though, that there was a roughly similar thing done to Native Americans, where they were forced from many different areas of the country on to reservations. Like the Japanese later, they were not charged with any crimes, nor were they given trials; they were just gathered up and moved. Unlike the later PJAs, though, the Native Americans were never fully released from their reservations.
Crazy stories began to appear again:
“In March of 1935 a California Congressman had told his colleagues that there were 25,000 armed Japanese on the West Coast ready to take to the field in case of war. The San Francisco Chronicle, at the same
time, quoted a state official to the effect that the "Japanese in
California are training for war." In May, 1936, Bernarr Macfadden
published an open letter in Liberty addressed to the President
in which he increased the number of Japanese "soldiers" in California
to 250,000.”
Isn't it reasonable to assume that if there were 25,000 or more Japanese soldiers in California that little fact would have become known to virtually everyone, and that PROOF of their presence would have been obtained?
The author does a little jump in time, and points out that the fact that the PJAs were evacuated from the West Coast PROVES that they were untrustworthy, at least according to the same people that originally said that the Japanese were untrustworthy, and therefore needed to be evacuated.
Evacuation History
“On December 11, 1941, the Western Defense Command was
established, the West Coast was declared a theater of war, and
General J. L. De Witt was designated as commander of the area.
On December 7 and 8, the Department of Justice arrested, on
Presidential warrants, all known "dangerous enemy aliens." Subsequently, by a series of orders the first of which was issued
on January 29, 1941, the Department ordered the removal of
all "enemy aliens" from certain designated zones or so-called
"spot" strategic installations, such as harbors, airports, and power
lines.”
“Following the appearance of the Roberts Report on Pearl
Harbor, January 25, "the public temper on the west coast
changed noticeably" and "by the end of January, a considerable
press demand appeared for the evacuation of all aliens, and especially of the Japanese from the west coast." The moment this
press campaign was launched, a highly significant meeting of the
entire West Coast Congressional delegation took place in Washington
under the chairmanship of Senator Hiram Johnson (a leader of the old anti-Oriental forces in California). On February 13, 1942, this delegation submitted a letter to the President recommending "the lineage" and suggesting that this might be accomplished
without a declaration of martial law (martial law had been proclaimed
in Hawaii on December 7). On February 14, 1942, General
De Witt submitted a memorandum to the War Department, in
which he recommended mass evacuation of the Japanese.
On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order
No. 9066, authorizing the War Department to prescribe military
areas and to exclude any or all persons from these areas. The
next day Mr. Stimson delegated this responsibility to General
De Witt, who, on March 2, 1942, issued Proclamation No. i,
setting up certain military areas.”
“Subsequently the General on March 27 prohibited all persons
of Japanese ancestry from leaving these military areas, and by
1 08 separate orders, the first of which was issued on March 24,
ordered all such persons to move from Military Areas No. i and
2 (embracing the states of Washington, Oregon, California, and
a portion of Arizona). Congress, in effect, ratified this action on
March 21, 1942, by the passage of Public Law No. 503, making
it a criminal offense for a person or persons excluded from military
areas to refuse to move. By June 5, 1942, all persons of
Japanese ancestry had been removed from Military Area No. 1;
by August 7, Military Area No. 2 had been cleared. This is a
brief log of events in the evacuation procedure the how of
evacuation.”
The author points out that the “risk of imminent invasion was obvious and real, but it was as grave in Hawaii as on the mainland.”
More grave, actually, since Hawaii had been attacked already, and since it was a lot nearer to Japan than was the West Coast.
“In his report, two considerations, not strictly military in character
perhaps, but certainly related to military security, are
stressed: the danger of sabotage and the risk of espionage. The
General knew, however, by February 14, that no acts of sabotage
had occurred in Hawaii. If the Japanese population contained
actual saboteurs, it is inconceivable that they would not have
made their appearance during the attack on Pearl Harbor, which
the Japanese government obviously intended to be a smashing,
crippling blow. What is more disconcerting, however, is the fact
that General De Witt cites the absence of sabotage as "a disturbing
and confirming indication that such action will be taken." 5
In other words, the absence of proof (and no Japanese on the
West Coast or in Hawaii have been convicted of sabotage) is
taken as evidence of a fact. It is also disturbing to note that the
General's suspicions were riveted on one minority and that he
minimized the likelihood of sabotage on the part of German and
Italian nationals who were possibly in a better position to commit
such acts by reason of the fact that their race did not identify
them as enemy nationals.”
This is the concept that, since someone has not done anything wrong, it's PROOF that they are planning to do something wrong. Sort of a “guilt by existence” type of mentality. We also were, indeed, fighting Italy and Germany, yet I don't know of any arguments made that, since the Italians and the Germans had been in the U.S. a long time, it was proof that they were plotting against the U.S. and should, therefore, all be rounded up.
The media played a major role in the reaction to Pearl Harbor:
"Despite the nature of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor," wrote Dr, Eric Bellquist of the University of California, "there was no immediate widespread reaction of suspicion of aliens and second-generation Japanese." Dr. Bellquist notes that it was not until after the "commentators, and columnists, 'professional patriots/ witchhunters, alien-baiters, and varied groups and persons with aims
of their own" began inflaming public opinion in January, 1942,
that hysteria began to develop.”
The PJAs tried to show their loyalty to the country:
“In the files of the Congressional Record, throughout 1940 and
1941, may be found numerous memorials and petitions from the
West Coast Japanese attesting their undivided allegiance to the
United States. On October 21, 1940, the entire Japanese population
of Imperial Valley, Nisei and Issei alike, assembled on the
courthouse steps in El Centro and reaffirmed their loyalty to this
country. On March 9, 1941, the Japanese-American Citizens
League met with the Los Angeles City Council, pledged their
fullest support, and asked to be given a chance to demonstrate,
in any manner suggested, their loyalty.”
Still, hatred has a way of disregarding facts.
All this is not to say that none of the PJAs supported Japan. There was a way to deal with them, though:
“Undeniably there were dangerous individuals among the West
Coast Japanese; undeniably there was a strong current of nationalistic
feeling among certain Issei leaders. But the point is that
these elements were well known to the authorities. They were
promptly arrested on December 7 and 8, both on the mainland
and in Hawaii. Writing in Collier's, in October, 1941, Jim Marshall
observed that "for five years or more there has been a constant
check on both Issei and Nisei the consensus among intelligent
people is that an overwhelming majority is loyal. The few
who are suspect are carefully watched. In event of war, they
would be behind bars at once. In case of war, there would be
some demand in California for concentration camps into which
Japanese and Japanese-Americans would be herded for the duration.
Army, Navy or FBI never have suggested officially that
such a step would be necessary.”
The author then examines the sociology and psychology of General De Witt's decision:
“It also develops that "military necessity" involved a judgment,
by an army official, on purely sociological problems. "The continued
presence of a large, unassimilated, tightly knit racial group,
bound to an enemy nation by strong ties of race, culture,
custom, and religion," states General De Witt, "constituted a
menace which had to be dealt with." Obviously there was a
problem involved on this score; but it is interesting to note that
West Coast sociologists who had studied the problem for years
did not draw the same conclusion as the General and, needless to
say, they were not consulted by him. No consideration whatever
was given to the possibility of launching a special morale program
or a campaign of so-called "preventive politics" in order to
cope with the problem.”
So a military general concludes there is a sociological problem with the PJAs, but sociologists said there wasn't.
De Witt's personal feelings about PJAs was evident when he testified on April 13, 1943, before the House Naval Affairs Subcommittee:
“A Jap's a Jap. They are a dangerous element, whether
loyal or not. There is no way to determine their loyalty. . . .
It makes no difference whether he is an American; theoretically
he is still a Japanese and you can't change him. . . .
You can't change him by giving him a piece of paper.”
One of the things before was Hawaii, and how they did not intern their PJAs but just declared martial law.
“Unlike their confreres in Hawaii, the dominant business interests
on the West Coast did not want to see martial law proclaimed.
24 These interests felt that, if some means could be devised
to get the Japanese excluded from the West Coast without
a declaration of martial law, then such a declaration might be
altogether avoided.”
The pressure for mass evacuation came, the author says, from a number of sources:
1. Groups that had an economic interest in evacuation
2. Traditional anti-Oriental organizations like the Asiatic Exclusion League and the American Legion.
3. Mayors of Los Angeles, San Francisco, Portland and Seattle.
4. Grand juries and city councils.
5. The mass media.
6. California Attorney General Earl Warren.
7. General De Witt.
Terminal Island
Terminal Island was a Japanese-American fishing colony. The Japanese-Americans living there were attacked on the basis of being spies for the Japanese, and that they lived there to help their spying activities.
First, the fishing colony was established by the American cannery business, not the Japanese. Second, that cannery required its workers to live close by. In addition:
“All of the Japanese fishermen were members of the Seine and
Line Fisherman's Union and, long prior to December 7, they had
repeatedly made declarations of their loyalty and support in case
of war.”
Japanese truck gardens near sensitive areas
One of the things that De Witt and some others tried to do was to claim that the PJAs had settled where they did and grew crops where they did to set themselves up to sabotage things once a war started. Their gardens were near factories, power lines, and refineries.
“Mr. Warren, ruler in hand, also pointed to small Japanese truck
gardens shown, by the map, to be located near factories, power
lines, and refineries. The Japanese, as previously shown, specialized
in the production of fresh vegetables for the urban West
Coast markets. By reason of freight and transportation costs, these
gardening units had to be placed near the markets themselves.
Located around the periphery of the city, they were naturally
intermeshed with sites used for industrial purposes. Only the
Japanese could farm these small plots successfully since they alone,
by their intensive cultivation methods, could pay the high rental
demanded for land which was essentially industrial, and not agricultural, in character.”
So, in effect, they really need to grow things in the areas where they did, and a lot of the land they used was land passed over by whites as being too hard to turn productive.
Japanese Language Schools
These were frowned upon by the white leaders. The Issei wanted them so their children would not forget to speak Japanese. The author notes that “...the Japanese themselves sponsored legislation to bring the vernacular schools under state regulation.” Later, the Japanese Association of America suggested that California enact similar legislation.
That isn't what deep-rooted anti-American spies and saboteurs would do, of course.
The author also points out that the language schools were not very successful.
The author points out something interesting about Italian language schools in California:
“Prior to December 7, 1941, the Italian consulates had distributed
fascist-inspired textbooks and other materials to Italian language
schools in California. But, at the Tolan Committee hearings, only
the Japanese language schools were deemed subversive or otherwise
suspect.”
Economic Pressures
There were people on the West Coast who were jealous of the Japanese success in growing crops. They figured that, if they could get them out of the way, then the profits would be theres. It didn't dawn on them that the Japanese were using farming techniques they weren't familiar with, and there was not going to be any automatic transfer of profits from the PJAs to the whites.
“But the California shipper-grower interests were definitely
in favor of mass evacuation and for admittedly selfish
reasons. Shortly after December 7, the Shipper-Grower Association of Salinas sent Mr. Austin E. Anson to Washington to lobby
for mass evacuation. "We're charged with wanting to get rid
-of the Japs for selfish reasons," said Mr. Anson. "We might as
well be honest. We do. It's a question of whether the white man
lives on the Pacific Coast or the brown men. They came into this
valley to work, and they stayed to take over." Similarly, so called "white interests" in the nursery and florist businesses were actively seeking mass evacuation as a means of elimination unwanted competition.”
These groups also figured that, with the Japanese out of the way, prices would rise, and they would make a very tidy profit.
“It can be definitely stated, however, that the removal of the
Japanese has had a most unfortunate effect on production insofar
as consumers are concerned. In its annual report for 1942, the
Federal-State Market News service stated that Southern California
consumers alone paid $10,000,000 more for 10,000 truckloads
less of perishable vegetables in 1942, by comparison with 1941:"
Removal of the Japanese has created a chaotic situation in the
wholesale produce markets in Los Angeles. Buyers complain that
it is currently either "a feast or a famine"; tomatoes flood the
market for a week and the next week cannot be obtained. The
deterioration of quality is a self-evident fact to any Southern
California consumer. In a report released on January 3, 1944, the
State Director of Agriculture accused retailers of fresh fruits and
vegetables in the state of charging prices ranging from "higher
than necessary" to "wholly unwarranted and exorbitant." In
some cases retailers, according to this report, have realized margins
of from 50 to 450 per cent above wholesale costs. Independent
buyers of produce throughout the state complain that
the removal of the Japanese has increased prices unnecessarily
and has resulted in a definite consolidation of economic controls
and a further extension in the direction of monopolistic price
structures.”
The Hammer Comes Down
When matters went south, they did so quickly.
“On July 26, 1941, the assets of Japanese nationals had been "frozen." The restrictions imposed on enemy aliens on December 7 and 8 had begun to hamper the Issei in their business activities and a serious economic crisis had developed.”
“Landlords had begun to evict Japanese
tenants; insurance policies were being canceled; social-security
payments could not be released to Japanese nationals. Japanese
firms were slowly losing patronage.”
“Nisei were being discharged
from their positions (they were summarily ousted from
city, county, and state civil-service positions without hearings
and with no charges being preferred against them).”
So, the PJAs had access to their own money blocked, the landlords began to kick them out, and they were losing their jobs in numerous areas without any just cause.
On February 15, 1942, the PJAs on Terminal Island were told to get ready. They were being moved out. No charges, no hearings, no trials. Just get out.
By this time two military areas were set up, Military Zones 1 and 2.
The PJAs were given a chance to voluntarily move out of Military Zone 1, but that was not very successful. Most of the PJAs living on the West Coast did not have relatives in other parts of the country they could live with, and they did not have the time to try to find a job in another state, go there, find a place to live, and move there.
They also often did not have the funds necessary for such an undertaking, and they weren't sure of what kind of reception they would receive.
Some state governors and various organizations openly opposed any PJAs moving into their state.
Arkansas:
“Typical of the replies received was the comment of
Governor Homer M. Adkins of Arkansas: "Our people are not
familiar with the customs or peculiarities
of the Japanese. We
are always anxious to co-operate in any way we can, but our
people, being more than 95 per cent native born, are in no manner
familiar with their customs and ways and have never had
any of them within our borders, and I doubt the wisdom of
placing any in Arkansas."
Kansas:
“Governor Payne Ratner of Kansas stated that
"Japs are not wanted and not welcome in Kansas" and directed
the state highway patrol to turn back any Japanese trying to
enter the state.”
Nevada:
“Typical of the general reaction was
the statement of the Nevada Bar Association: "We feel that if
Japs are dangerous in Berkeley, California, they are likewise dangerous to the State of Nevada."
Idaho:
“Speaking on May 22, 1942, Governor,
Chase Clark of Idaho, for example, had said: "The Japs live like
rats, breed like rats, and act like rats. I don't want them coming
into Idaho, and I don't want them taking seats in our university^</p>
The “signs of the times” were also evident, as PJAs saw signs like these:
“This restaurant poisons both rats and Japs.
From a barbershop: “Japs Shaved: Not Responsible for Accidents.”
“Open season for Japs.”
Internment Camps Not Originally Planned
“It is important to remember, as Mr. Dillon Myer has pointed
out, that "internment camps were never intended in relation to
this program." All that was originally contemplated was an order
excluding persons of Japanese descent from the area. When it
became apparent that these persons were slow to move, that they
needed assistance; and when it gradually dawned on the authorities
that they did not even know where to move, then and only
then were plans prepared which contemplated assistance, supervision,
and control of the movement. Voluntary evacuation was
then "frozen" and the Wartime Civil Control Administration
was created as a branch of the Western Defense Command to
supervise the removal of the evacuees.”
Signs began to appear on telephone poles, telling the PJAs they were being moved out:
“For those long proclamations ordering removal which appeared
in the newspapers, were announced over the radio, and
were tacked to telegraph poles and posted on bulletin boards,
referred to "all persons of Japanese ancestry." No exceptions
were specified; no provision was made for cases involving mixed
marriages; and one drop of Japanese blood brought a person
within the category defined. Here a group was being singled out
for discriminatory treatment solely upon the basis of race or
ancestry. In Germany, as Dr. Morris Opler has pointed out, the
Nazis merely pretended to discriminate against persons on the
score of race or ancestry.”
The Assembly Centers
The first thing that was done to the PJAs was to get them from their homes and businesses and to assembly centers, which were often constructed on horse racing tracks and other areas.
“In a period of 28 days, army engineers had constructed shelters
in assembly centers for 100,000 people, and in a period of 137
days the same number of people had been moved into these
centers. By June 8, 1942, the entire movement from points of
residence in Military Area No. 1 to assembly centers had been
effected; and shortly afterwards those remaining in Military Area
No. 2 had likewise been removed. By that date, virtually every
Japanese, citizen and alien alike, in the three West Coast states
and portions of Arizona was in an assembly center. The only
exceptions were Japanese confined to institutions, such as hospitals,
prisons, insane asylums, and orphanages.”
“Many of these centers were not completed when
the evacuees began to arrive. The evacuees helped to build them;
assisted in making them livable; and quickly assumed major responsibilities in their administration.”
The author points out that the evacuees, almost to a person, cooperated with the government.
“Negroes”
Remember that his book was written at a time when discrimination against blacks was still ultra-strong, so statements like the following were considered normal:
“The removal of the Japanese has had other 2nd, in some respects,
rather amusing aspects. While the race purists of the
state have been gloating over the removal of aa "unassimilable"
minority of around 90,000, the vacuum in the labor market occasioned
by the removal of the Japanese is in part responsible for
the current influx of Negroes from the Deep South. Approximately
90,000 Japanese have been removed from the state and
approximately 150,000 Negroes have been attracted into it. By
and large, the Negroes have flooded into the Little Tokyo areas
which were left vacant when the Japanese were removed. Little
Tokyo in Los Angeles has recently been rechristened as Bronzeville.
The influx of Negroes has created special problems of
housing, education, and recreation and, at the same time, has contributed to the steadily mounting racial tensions.”
Hawaii
In Hawaii, PJAs formed some 34.2% of the total population.
“But the agitation never reached
serious proportions primarily because the economic oligarchy
that rules Hawaii did not look with favor upon such a movement
(although the same interests actually subsidized anti-Japanese
agitation on the Pacific Coast).”
Marital law was declared on the islands. There were some arrests of PJAs, generally from this grouping: Shinto and Buddhists priests; language school teachers; consular agents; Kibei (Nisei who had gone to Japan to get their schooling and then returned), and “organizational leaders having close ties with Japan.”
That was it. No mass evacuations, and no uprisings, riots, mobs, sabotage or other anti-American actions from the PJAs still living on the islands.
Another reason why the PJAs were not evacuated off of the islands:
“There are, of course, certain obvious differences between the
situation in Hawaii and that which prevailed on the West Coast.
In the first place, it would have been practically impossible to
have found shipping space to move 160,000 people across 2000
miles of ocean to the mainland. To have done so, if the shipping
had been available, would have caused immeasurable damage to
the internal economy of the islands. The manpower problem
was acute and the Japanese could not be spared. Furthermore,
in the islands they have had the "powerful and determined support
of the highly centralized business interests of Hawaii." 48
In Hawaii they were supported by the dominant economic interests;
on the mainland these interests wanted them evacuated.
But a more powerful reason why evacuation was not ordered
consists in the fact, pointed out by Dr. Romanzo Adams, that
"the race mores of Hawaii are or tend to be the mores of race
equality." Effective interracial solidarity had been established in
Hawaii before the war; it had not been established on the mainland.”
The anti-Japanese people on the West Coast actually were against evacuating the PJAs from Hawaii. They didn't want them moved to the West Coast or anywhere else on the mainland.
Another reason they were not moved was that the person on the islands responsible for dealing with everything was, in fact, quite responsible and level-headed.
“It should be pointed out, however, that Hawaii had a very
sensible and levelheaded commander in the person of General
Delos Emmons. After he had succeeded General Short, General
Emmons acted decisively and firmly to prevent the rise of hysteria.
He publicly warned that there "must not be indiscriminate
displacement of labor"; and stressed that "we must not knowingly
and deliberately deny any loyal citizen the opportunity
to exercise or demonstrate his loyalty in a concrete way." Hawaii,
of course, seethed with rumors of Japanese sabotage after the
attack on Pearl Harbor. These rumors were systematically investigated
and publicly exposed as unfounded. For the uncontradicted
facts are that no sabotage occurred in Hawaii on December
7, 1941. This statement can be made today in reliance upon
emphatic assurances to this effect issued by the Secretary of War,
the Secretary of the Navy, the Honolulu Police Department, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the various intelligence
services involved.”
There were some things done in Hawaii in addition to martial law. The Japanese language schools were closed. All but two of the various Japanese publications were shut down.
Another difference was that the Nisei had assumed a more important role on the islands in the leadership of their people.
So, basically, a lot of the difference centered on the leader of the military group overseeing the PJA situation, and the way that the Nisei had already fit into Hawaiian society which was, itself, a rather polyglot mixture of peoples and cultures.
Alaska
Something I haven't seen addressed elsewhere was what happened to any PJAs in Alaska. There were 134 of them removed to the Minidoka internment camp.
“In Alaska they lived in native
Indian villages, hunted whale and seal. Speaking a jargon of English,
Eskimo, Indian, and Japanese, most of these evacuees had
never associated with Japanese people in their lives.”
Canada
The Canadian policy was strongly influenced by the U.S. mainland policy.
“Immediately subsequent to
Pearl Harbor, the Royal Mounted Police arrested about 178
"dangerous aliens" and interned them for the duration. Special
regulations were invoked; fishing licenses were canceled; curfews
were imposed. Following the pattern established on the West
Coast, the Japanese-language schools were closed by voluntary
agreement with the Japanese; and the press was suspended.”
Protected areas were set up, like the military zones in the U.S., and on March 4, 1942, a commission was established to supervise the evacuation of PJAs from these areas.
Executive Order 9102
This created the War Relocation Authority.
“On April 7, 1942, the first director of WRA, Mr. Milton
Eisenhower, met with a group of Western governors in a conference
in Salt Lake City. At the meeting, WRA presented a
relocation plan which consisted of three basic points:
(a) establishment of Government-operated centers where
some of the evacuees could be quartered and could contribute
through work on government projects, to their
own support;
(b) re-employment of evacuees in private industry or in
agriculture outside the evacuated areas;
(c) governmental assistance for small groups of evacuees
desiring to establish self-supporting colonies of an agricultural
character.
The reaction of the assembled governors was "unmistakable."
They expressed strong opposition to any type of unsupervised
relocation. Following this meeting, WRA was compelled to
abandon, momentarily at least, alternatives (b) and (tf), and to
concentrate all its efforts upon alternative (a). To accomplish
this end, WRA worked out a co-operative or joint agreement
with the War Department whereby, in effect, the
War Department agreed to construct the necessary facilities in
the centers and WRA assumed full administrative responsibility.
The selection of sites was not an easy problem. All centers had
to be located on public land; at a safe distance from strategic
areas; capable of providing adequate work opportunities throughout
the year; and of such size that a minimum of 5000 evacuees
could be assembled in the particular project. Over 300 possible
sites were examined and surveyed.”
The end result was the establishment of ten relocation centers. People were moved from the assembly centers, or from their homes, to these relocation centers (also called internment camps).
“The centers and their population as of July 10, 1943,
were as follows:
Topaz, Utah 7,287
Poston, Arizona 15153
Rivers, Arizona 12,355
Amache, Colorado 6170
Heart Mountain, Wyoming 91292
Denson, Arkansas 7,767
Manzanar, California 8,716
Hunt, Idaho 7,548
Relocation, Arkansas 7,616
Newell, California (Tule Lake) 13,422
Total 95703
Into these centers were also moved a small group of Japanese
from Alaska; approximately 1073 Japanese from Hawaii; 1300
Japanese paroled from the internment camps; and a small number
of Japanese who, although living outside the Western Defense
Command, voluntarily moved into the centers for protection.”
The author then talks about the physical makeup of the camps. He also takes issue with those who have referred to them as “concentration camps,” since those horrors were of another nature entirely.
The evacuees were under various sets of rules:
1. The general law of the United States.
2. The laws of the state the camp was in.
3. The regulations of the WRA.
4. The regulations made by the community council of the particular camp.
Really troublesome persons were sent to a camp in Leupp, Arizona.
The writer then talks about the schools that were set up in the camps. There were efforts made to get some students into non-camp schools, but these were sometimes met with strong opposition. Oregon, for example, refused to allow some Japanese children who were deaf to enter their school for the deaf. The University of Arizona opposed helping at all, the President of the school saying “We are at war and these people are our enemies.”
Voting Rights
Remember that around two-thirds of the PJAs were actually citizens of the U.S. As citizens, they had the right to vote, even if they were in internment camps. The Native Sons of the Golden West tried to have them removed from voting rolls in California, but they failed.
Hirabayashi vs. the United States
“On June 21, 1943, the Supreme Court handed down its decision
in the case of Gordon Hirabayashi vs. United States.
Hirabayashi had been convicted of violating both the curfew and
the evacuation orders. While the court held that the curfew
regulation was a valid exercise of the war power, it pointedly
refused to pass on the question of the constitutionality of the
evacuation order. From language contained in the various opinions
filed in the matter, it is quite apparent that the Supreme
Court entertains the gravest doubts as to the constitutionality of
evacuation insofar as the Nisei are concerned.”
Korematsu vs. the United States
“In a later case, Korematsu vs. United States^ decided by the
Ninth Circuit Court on December 2, 1943, the evacuation order
was upheld as constitutional.”
Seasonal Leave
One of the problems growers faced was that much of the labor used to harvest the crops had already been drafted. The need for food was critical, but there weren't enough people to pick it. Thus, some PJAs were allowed to leave the camps for short times to help in this.
“At first WRA proceeded
with great caution in releasing evacuees for seasonal work: special
safeguards and restrictions were imposed, special regulations
invoked. But as the pressures increased, the regulations were gradually relaxed and, on September 29, 1942, WRA announced a
liberalized release program.”
“By the end of 1942, some 9000 evacuees were working in agricultural
areas throughout the West and were being enthusiastically
praised as model workmen. There is no doubt that they
saved the sugar-beet crop in Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, and Montana.”
What did California do for their farming needs? They brought in Mexicans.
The leave program was thus quite successful.
“So successful was the seasonal leave program that, in October,
1942, Mr. Myer announced that henceforth relocation outside the
centers would be the major goal of WRA policy. As a consequence,
agricultural and industrial projects within the centers
were sharply curtailed and the entire program was geared toward
rapid individual relocation in private employment. Thus, within
the space of six months, the emphasis shifted from resettlement
in centers to relocation outside the centers; from planned colonization to individual dispersal over a wide area. Early in 1943
employment offices were opened throughout the Middle West
and East; the clearance of leave applications was expedited; and
every inducement was offered evacuees to leave the centers and
to relocate before the war was over.”
This also led to one conclusion: the camps couldn't be made too attractive, since people would not be inclined to leave them. So some improvement simply weren't made.
The people who left the centers to find permanent jobs elsewhere generally were treated well, but there were some incidents in New Mexico, Indiana, New York and Illinois, but nothing terribly serious.
The author also goes into some of the psychological fears that people had living in the center, relating to life there and outside.
The Manzanar and Poston Incidents
The physical cond itions during summer at the two camps were similar, daytime temperatures getting up to about 120 degrees.
Once the people were in the camps, the author says, there was competition for power. The groups included:
1. Militant anti-facists.
2. Pro-American middle-class elements, anti-Communist conservatives.
3. Japanese loyalists.
4. Plain hoodlums (Poston, Manzanar, Tule Lake)
These groups composed about 5% of the population of the camps, the other 95% being people just doing the best they could to get along.
There were beatings:
“Karl Yoneda, a former longshoreman, a man who has fought
fascism in Japan and on the San Francisco waterfront for years,
was severely beaten at Manzanar and his life was threatened. He
circulated a petition in the center calling for the opening of a
second front in Europe and promptly volunteered for service
when enlistment was made possible.”
And strikes:
“From November 14 to November 25, the center residents at Poston
were on strike, protesting the arrest of two persons charged
with having beaten an alleged informer. The protest was orderly
enough (there was no rioting); but the incident which precipitated
the protest was not its real cause. The causes were to be
found in all of the tensions, resentments, and frictions that I have
mentioned.”
And riots:
“Similarly, on the eve of the anniversary of Pearl Harbor,
December 6, 1942, a riot occurred at Manzanar. Here, too,
the ostensible cause of the incident was the arrest of a center
resident; but the incident was merely the result of antecedent
tensions.”
This led to an effort by the WRA to separate the loyal from the disloyal/troublemaking elements.
Registration and Questionnaire
The WRA did a registration, and a questionnaire which caused problems, due to two questions, 27 and 28. People 17 and up were required to fill out the materials. This is one of the very few sources I have seen, if not the only one, that lists question 27 as given to women:
“Question 27: If the opportunity presents itself and you are
found qualified, would you be willing to volunteer for the
Army Nurse Corps or the WAAC?”
Question 28, the more controversial of the two, originally was worded this way:
“Question 28: Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the
United States of America and foreswear any form of allegiance
or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government, power or organization?”
One thing to keep in mind was that the Issei were not allowed, by law, to become U.S. citizens. If they answered this question “yes,” there was a possibility it could be interpreted as giving up their Japanese citizenship, thus leaving them as people with a country.
The question was later changed for the Issei to:
“Will you swear to abide by the laws of the United States
and to take no action which would in any way interfere
with the war effort of the United States?”
The wording here is much better.
Anyhow, people were torn about how to answer the questions, and ended up generally falling in two groups, the “yes-yes” and the “no-no” groups. The latter ended up in Tule Lake.
There was a lot of controversy in the camps over the questions, and families were unable to agree on how to answer them. Pressure was put on people to answer a certain way. At the Gila center, 27 were arrested for intimidation and coercion. At Tule Lake, that number was 60. The president of the JACL was attacked at Poston, and a professor and a reverend were beaten at Topaz.
How You Treat People Makes A Difference
Remember the differences between Hawaii and the mainland, and how Issei and Nisei were treated? How you treat people does make a difference. When the government decided to allow Nisei to join the American military, they first asked for volunteers. They got around 10,000 volunteers from Hawaii, but from the internment camps they got about a tenth that number.
The proposal was met with dislike by certain in various areas:
“It is interesting to note that the proposal to form a combat
team of volunteers met with instant opposition in California
from the American Legion, the Native Sons of the Golden
West, and the California Grange. Representative Rankin of
Mississippi took the floor in Congress to denounce the proposal.
All persons of Japanese descent, he said, should be put in labor
battalions. He was particularly upset by the response shown by
the Nisei in Hawaii, who, he charged, had "aided in fifth-column
activity," despite conclusive evidence that no acts of sabotage
were reported. At the same time, he recommended that the
United States deport all persons of Japanese descent at the end
of the war and that the government buy their property holdings,
valued at $200,000,000. Interestingly enough, he suggested that
the South would be happy to co-operate with the West in its
efforts to "wipe out the Japanese menace.*' 1T Senator Chandler,
of Kentucky, has also spoken out in favor of a racial alliance
between the South and the West.”
Tule Lake
Tule Lake was set aside as sort of the place for troublemakers and other problem people. Various elements were sent there:
1. Anyone who had requested repatriation to Japan.
2. Anyone answer “no” to both questions 27 and 28.
3. Anyone who had been denied a leave clearance.
4. Relatives of the above groups who requested to be sent there.
As can be expected, when you people who have caused problems together in one place, more problems will arise, and they did:
“On October 15, 1943, an accident
occurred at the center in which some 29 evacuees were injured
and one was killed. On the day following, no evacuees reported
for work. The strike or protest lasted for about two weeks.
During this time, the real trouble-makers raised a very serious
legal issue. Prior to segregation, it could be argued that the
evacuees were not "prisoners of war" and that they were, therefore,
not protected by the provisions of the Geneva Convention.
But the moment segregation was effected, a different situation
arose. WRA had been careful to call those sent to Tule Lake
"segregants" and not "prisoners." But Tule Lake is not a relocation
center: it is a concentration camp. There is a much larger
detachment of troops on hand; the camp is carefully guarded;
a double barbed-wire fence encloses the camp; and a military
censorship prevails. Residents of Tule Lake are not, of course,
eligible
for either seasonal or permanent leaves.”
Also:
“Demonstrations occurred at the Tule Lake center on November
i, and on November 4 the Army assumed full control. During
these demonstrations a doctor was beaten, some property was
damaged, and some of the resident personnel were moved outside
the center for a few days. The evidence indicates, however, that
the demonstrations, with the exception of the acts noted, were
conducted in an orderly fashion and that their subsequent characterization
as "riots" was wholly unjustified.”
Tule Lake was not the only place that had problems, though:
“One old Issei bachelor, James Hatsuaki Wakasa, on April 1 1,
1943, left his barrack at the Topaz center, and started walking
toward the barbed-wire fence which surrounds the area. The
soldier in the watchtower ordered him to stop; but he kept right
on walking toward the fence. He was unarmed, alone; he seemed
in a daze. Again he was ordered to halt; but he seemed not to
hear or to understand. He was shot and killed by the sentry.”
It is possible that the man was actually almost deaf and never heard the guard.
The author then has a chapter on how the PJAs felt about things, and what kind of experiences they had.
One of the interesting bits:
“With scarcely a single exception, the Nisei believe that evacuation
was brought about by race bigots in California and that they
were singled out for removal by reason of the color of their
skins and the slant of their eyes.”
An interesting statistic I had not seen elsewhere; there were about 10,000 persons of Japanese ancestry who lived outside the Western Defense Command and who were not involved in the relocation program.
We Don't Want Them Back!
One the anti-Japanese forces in California had succeeded in driving out the Japanese, then they set out on a plan to make sure that the Issei and Nisei could never return.
“Once evacuation had been
achieved, the next logical step was taken: the launching of a
large-scale campaign to prevent the return of the evacuees. But
the eventual goal that these forces have in mind, and toward
which they are now bending every effort, is the deportation of
every man, woman, and child in the United States of Japanese
ancestry old and young,citizen and alien, first, second, third and fourth generations.”
Another reason they got so upset was that it was Presidential election, and the issue of PJAs “..could be used to 'smear' the liberal and progressive movement in California.”
Other Anti-Japanese groups
1.The Americanism Educational League, under the direction of a former clergyman, Dr. John R. Lechner.
2. The Home Front Commandos, Inc.
“Come and hear the facts Lend your help to Deport the
Japs If you can't trust a Jap, you won't want him as a neighbor
Any good man can become an American citizen, but
a Jap is and always will be a Stabber-in-the-Back gangster;
rebel. After the war, ship them back to their Rising Sun
Empire.”
3. Pacific Coast Japanese Problem League, headed by a minister, Dr. John Carruthers. He says “It is our Christian duty to keep the Japanese out of this western world of Christian civilization.”
4.California Citizens Association of Santa Barbara.
5. The California Citizens Council.
6. The American Foundation for the Exclusion of the Japanese.
7. No Japs, Incorporated.
These are in addition to The California Joint Immigration Committee, the Native Sons of the Golden West, the State Grange, and the Associated Farmers.
The Campaign Begins
1. December, 1942: The Executive Committee of the American Legion, California Dept., wants a committee to conduct an “impartial investigation of all Japanese Relocation Areas in the State of California.” The charters of the Townsend Harris and Commodore Perry American Legion posts are suspended, since they were formed of Japanese WWI veterans.
2. January, 1943. Local pasts pass resolutions urging the deportation of all Japanese, period.
3. Jan-March, 1943. The Supervisors Association of the State of California wants the Japanese language banned forever from the state. The Native Sons of the Golden West and the California Grange oppose the formation of an all-Japanese combat team by the U.S. military.
4. California legislature reconvenes, is presented with numerous anti-evacuee bills and resolutions.
5. The movement spreads.
“Wyoming passed a bill making it impossible for the evacuees at the
Heart Mountain center to qualify as voters in the state; Arkansas
sought to close the doors of its public schools to "members of
the Mongolian race"; communities in Michigan and Indiana protested
against the employment of evacuees in their localities; the
Deriver Post, on February 14, 1943, launched a vicious series of
articles aimed at making the position of the evacuees in Colorado
untenable; the movement for deportation gained definite momentum
in California; petitions and resolutions from various state
legislatures and California citizen groups against the student relocation program and the induction of Japanese-Americans into
die services were presented to Congress; Arkansas passed a bill
making it illegal for a person of Japanese ancestry to own land
in the state; Arizona passed a statute making it virtually impossible
for anyone to conduct business transactions with a person
whose liberties had been "restricted"; mass meetings were held in
Wisconsin protesting the employment of evacuees...”
6. “On April 19, 1943, General J. L. De Witt issued Public Proclamation No. 17 which, by its terms, authorized Japanese-American
soldiers, serving with our forces, to return to the West Coast
while on furlough or on leave. There is every reason to believe
that General De Witt signed this proclamation not on his own
initiative, but pursuant to instructions from the War Department.
For on April 13, testifying in San Francisco before the House
Naval Affairs Subcommittee, he had volunteered this information:
"There is developing a sentiment on the part of certain
individuals to get the Japanese back to the Coast. I am opposing
it with every means at my disposal. ... A Jap's a Jap.
They are a dangerous element, whether loyal or not. There
is no way to determine their loyalty. ... It makes no difference
whether he is an American; theoretically he is still a
Japanese and you can't change him.”
7. The Dies committee, hearings held June 8 to July 7, 1943.
“The Dies Committee never intended to make an investigation
of the evacuation program. It was summoned to California to
make newspaper headlines and to keep the "Japanese issue" alive,
for political and other purposes.”
8. The media:
“Individuals who, in testifying before
California legislative committees, had urged fair play were denounced
over the radio as "Jap-Lovers" and the "Kiss-a-Jap-a-
Day boys." Typical headlines from the Los Angeles Times were:
"District Attorney Sees Bloodshed if Japs Return Servicemen
Vow to Kill Nips" (October 19, 1943) and "Rioting Predicted
in Event Japs Return to California" (December 10, 1943).”
Japanese Distribution at the end of 1943
1. 8,000 to 10,000 in the U.S. military.
2. 87,000 in relocation centers.
3. 8,000 who had voluntarily moved from the West Coast.
4. 10,000 who were not near the West Coast and were not involved at all in the internment process.
4. 19,000 who had been released from the centers during the year and who had relocated mainly in the Middle West.
The rest of the book deals with the current (1944) situation, and the author's epilogue.
Main Index
Japan main page
Japanese-American Internment Camps index page
Japan and World War II index page
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