The Great Decision: The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb (1959)

The author points out that the Japanese buildings were not all flimsy, but many were, in fact, constructed to meet certain earthquake codes. The problem was that the buildings were very close together, and many in the residential section were easily burned.

The author also says that area bombing was used because “much of Japan's war product was fabricated in home workshops.”

In the March 9/10 firebombing of Tokyo, tail-gunners on the planes returning from the bombing could see the glow of the flames from 150 miles away.

Nagoya was another target hit right after. An American naval ship 150 miles off the shore of Nagoya said its visibility was cut to one mile because of smoke from the burning city.

Oppenheimer had figured that only around 20,000 people would probably be killed by the atomic bomb.

One argument the book gives against announcing where the first atomic bomb would be dropped was that the Japanese air defenses were not totally powerless and might have been able to down the plane.

The Interim Committee that existed to study the use of the bomb voted against a demonstration of the bomb and for the military use of the bomb.

It suggested using the bomb, without specific warning, “as soon as possible and against such a target as to make clear its devastating strength.”

Near the end of the war the Japanese still had an army of five million men (scattered over a rather wide area, though). There was almost no Navy left. They did have a lot of planes left for kamikaze use.

If the atomic bomb had not been used and the invasion of Japan itself would have taken place, the fighting would have probably continued until the latter part of 1946. It would also have cost a million US casualties, according to Secretary of War Stimson.

Stimson also said that the Emperor should have a “compelling” reason for surrender, a reason of such a nature that the people of Japan would understand his reason for surrendering.

The author gives his personal opinion that the atomic bomb should have been first dropped in some kind of demonstration, and should not have been dropped without warning.

The author also believes that we were “ruthless” in adopting a policy of area bombing, and that our demand for unconditional surrender was “unrealistic.”

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