Japan's Fatally Flawed Air Arms

Aviation History, Sept. 2006.

The article starts off by saying that the Japanese Army and Navy did not cooperate at all on aerial matters. This was reflected in a near total lack of cooperation in almost every single phase of anything involving aerial missions, from planes through bases through repairs.

The article says that when Japan entered the war it did not have enough aircraft and most of them were not that good (except for the Zero ) It adds there were two few aircrews. Neither branch of the military was ready for the 'duration, violence or sophistication' of the war' that they ended up starting. They did not seem to understand just how important airplanes were going to be.

The article says the military must be balanced between the number of aircraft they have, the combat and maintenance crews, and the air bases they have and what shape they are in. The Japanese were unable to construct runways as quickly or as well as the American forces could. This caused them to lose planes on landing and they did not have the facilities for getting the planes repaired.

The Japanese would use captured airfields, while the Americans would use those and, if needed, build ones of their own.

Further, the planes were subordinate to ground force commanders; they did not act as a separate entity. The Navy planes and what went with them were designed for use with the Navy, and the Army planes for use with the Army. This prevented any major shifting or forces and material from one branch to the other if the need arose.

When the time came that things like new air bases and more maintenance needed to be done there were no plans in place for getting things from one place to another. Remember that, by this point in the war, American submarines were sinking Japanese merchant ships left and right and American planes and submarines could attack Japanese military transports.

A specific example is given of this lack of cooperation.

Because the army and navy did not cooperate, army aircraft on New Guinea had to fly 1,500 miles to Manila for engine changes even though the navy had major maintenance assets as close as Rabaui. Even at Rabaul, aircraft maintenance was so limited that of 60 fighters and 40 bombers that might be on hand, only a mix of 30 typically could fiy on a given date.

Japan also lacked the necessary equipment to build runways, while the Seebees of the American forces had loads of equipment and knew just how to use it in the most efficient manner. The Japanese Army and Navy could not even agree on what voltage to use on their engines. The gunmounts differed between the two groups so there was almost no standardization of material.

Another factor that played havoc with both branches was the loss of veteran pilots during the early part of the war. Training of new pilots was shorted which meant that when they flew they could no longer match the American pilots in quality. The Marianas Turkey Shoot was a perfect example of this.

Near the end of the war lack of fuel had a major effect on the usage of their flying forces. Gradually the only planes the Japanese had in moderate abundance were those marked for kamikaze use. This meant that the Japanese could no longer protect their shipping with aerial coverage and a major example of what this led to was the sinking of the massive battleship Yamato.

Main Index
Japan main page
Japanese-American Internment Camps index page
Japan and World War II index page