Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War (1959)

The author notes what some others have, and that is the military planners had not really figured the how other countries would react to the Japanese moves into South Indo-China. The Japanese army considered Britain to be “senile,” and figured that the German submarines and a German invasion of Britain would take care of the British once and for all.The military did not understand or believe, for that matter, the industrial capability of the United states. Plus, they “made light of America's spiritual fiber.”

In effect, the military over-estimated the ability of Germany, and pretty much under-estimated the abilities of other countries.

In talking about Guadalcanal, the author notes that American forces landed with full equipment, whereas Japanese forces attempting to land were often mauled by US planes during the attempt. The Japanese controlled neither the skies nor the sea at Guadalcanal. Further, the author says the front-line troops began to die of hunger, and many became sick with malaria and other diseases.

The author notes a number of problems relating to the Japanese preparation for defense of the homeland if Operation Olympic and Operation Coronet were used:

Lack of labor; lowered production; shortages of food; lack of arms; lack of places for soldiers to stay; difficulties in procuring lumber form those who owned it; plus disorderliness “of officers and men swarming in towns and villages; the troops were especially selfish in behavior where food was concerned.”

Supplies of fuel for the Army were extremely low late in the war. Eventually alcohol would have to be used. (These kinds of problems caused troubles for the planes as far as their engines went, which was just another factor damaging Japanese aerial defenses.)

As far as developing an atomic bomb goes, Japan had a bit of a program, but its scientists didn't think a bomb could be developed before the end of the war.

An American invasion of Japan would have been a good news-bad news type of thing. The bad news was that there would be three times the number of transports as were used in the attack on Germany. The good news was that it would give the Japanese more targets to shoot at.

April 8, 1945: Percepts Concerning the Decisive Battle manual was given to the entire Army. It emphasized the use of suicide tactics, and urged the men to “defend Imperial soil to the last.”

Article XI of the Meiji Constitution of 1889: “The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and of the Navy.”

Before the outbreak of the war, some Japanese governmental officials stressed the disunity in the US as far as some people wanting the country to remain isolationist while others wanted the US to actively support Britain.

The author has some interesting bits on Japanese claims of war tallies. :

Battle of Savo Island, Aug. 8, 1942: Japanese claim the US lost 8 cruisers and 6 destroyers. The actual losses were 4 cruisers and 0 destroyers.

Battle of the Eastern Solomons. Aug. 24, 1942: Japanese claim one carrier was severely damaged, and another carrier and a battleship were also damaged. One carrier was actually damaged. What the Japanese didn't include was their own losses of one carrier, one destroyer, one transport and 90 planes (US losses were 20 planes.)

Battle of Cape Esperance, Oct. 11-12, 1942: Japanese claim one heavy cruiser and one destroyer were sunk, and one cruiser was damaged. Actual results; the US lost one destroyer. The Japanese lost a heavy cruiser and three destroyers in total.

Battle of Santa Cruz; Oct. 26, 1942: Japanese claim three aircraft carriers, one battleship, one cruiser, and one destroyer were all sunk. Actual losses were one carrier and one destroyer.

Battle of Guadalcanal, Nov. 13-15. Japanese claim 7-8 cruisers, 4-8 destroyers sunk, 2 battleships crippled, 2-3 cruisers and 4 destroyers crippled. The US actually lost 3 cruisers and 7 destroyers sunk, so the Japanese claims for once were not very far off. On their side, the Japanese losses were:

Nov. 13: One battleship, 2 destroyers sunk, 4 destroyers hurt.

Nov. 14: One heavy cruiser, six transports sunk, variety of other ships damaged.

Nov. 15: One battleship sunk, plus another destroyer sunk.

The US attack on Truk island seems to have accomplished quite a bit. It cut Japanese supplies by 75%; 2 likght cruisers, 4 destoryers, 3 auxiliary cruisers, 2 submarine tenders, 2 subchasers, 1 armed trawler and a plane ferry were destroyed, and 24 Marine ships destroyed.

The statistics for the Japanese side of the Okinawa campaign include 107,539 “counted dead,” 23,764 probably dead, sealed in caves or buried by the Japanese themselves, 10,755 prisoners-of-war, and 7,850 planes shot down. US losses were 49,151 (wounded, dead, missing-in-action).Plane losses were 763.

To show just how totally unrealistic some of the Japanese officials responded to the atomic bomb, a report of a meeting between the War Minister Anami and Field Marshal Hata is given, where it's revealed that the bomb didn't seem to have much of an effect on anything one foot below the surface of the ground, and the War Minister thought that was great news.

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