This is another in the History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. As is usual, I'll only point out a few highlights of this excellent book.
In July of 1944, the plan for the Philippines was not yet settled. There was a possibility that Formosa would be earmarked for invasion.
As of early November 1944, the Japanese man in charge of defense of Leyte knew that the Japanese could not hold it. The Japanese built up the number of suicide boats that they had, planning to use those as a defensive measure.
The island of Mindoro was wanted to be used for airfields.
The Japanese never really mined the area around the Philippines, thinking they would “annihilate” the American attackers and mines wouldn't be necessary.
There was one American convoy that was very slow but, luckily, was never attacked by the Japanese. Radio Tokyo, nevertheless, broadcast that the convoy had been totally destroyed, which surprised the men on the convoy somewhat.
As of the Philippine operations, kamikaze statistics ran this way; 1 in 4 of the kamikaze found a target, and 1 in 33 kamikaze managed to sink a ship. The American military kept this out of the press for as long as they could.
One of the reasons the Japanese used the kamikaze was that the normal plane attacks weren't working; they couldn't get through the U.S. fighter protection and hit ships normally.
One of the reasons MacArthur wanted the Philippines invaded and Formosa put off was to free POWs and civilians that the Japanese had interned.
The book also goes into American submarine operations.
Probably the strongest part of the book, and the most upsetting, is the number of incidents of successful kamikaze attacks that the author describes in detail.
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