Japanese Militarism: Its Cause and Cure (1945)

This book was published before the war actually ended.

The book talks about one possibility at the end of the war, and that is the execution of the Emperor and the Imperial Family. The author believes that such an approach would lead to “a dangerous underground restoration movement in Japan.” It would make the US control of Japan harder, and speed up the rebirth of a dangerous nationalism. The author also adds that “The Japanese people themselves must be encouraged in every way to rid themselves of the imperial institution.”

(What actually happened: The Emperor was not executed or even charged with war crimes. The Allies felt that if they did not hurt him, they could use him to help subdue the Japanese people, basically. The Emperor did eventually say he was not really divine, but the position of Emperor was not done away with.)

The author also examines the origin of Japanese militarism in its historical context of “age-old social, political and economic factors.”

As one example of the book being written before the end of the war: “...we are killing Japanese at a rate that indicates we shall certainly win the war, no matter what Japan's leaders may do.”

The author spends a lot of time talking about the need to change the ideas of the Japanese people and not just defeat the military.

The author says the idea that the Japanese were fighting for an “Asia for the Asiatics” was no more realistic than if the Nazis had said they were fighting for a Europe for the Europeans.

As far as the war being a racial war, the author says that it is not a racial war, but it's a war of ideas, and that saying it's a racial war would be a diversion from what it truly was, a war of conquest based on a particular way of thinking.

As far as whether the Japanese people themselves supported the war, the author says that “It is not an exaggeration to state that the nation stood as one behind the policy of aggression that was bringing Japan to her doom.”

The author says that many Japan's early victories were due to “weak neighbors.” He also says that, although various countries did not like what Japan was doing in China, they were not willing to go to war to stop it.

One of the things that helped the government's early propaganda was the Western use of tariffs against Japanese goods.

The author adds: “...the insularity and chauvinism of the people were great contributing factors in the development of the spirit of militarism in Japan. Cut off from the flow of more liberal ideas that swept through the West after the first World War, and ignorant of the potential power of the United States and Great Britain, the people of Japan were not conscious of their limitations and of the limitations of the Japanese armed forces. Fed by victories over relatively inferior opponents, the Japanese people felt that the Japanese Army and Navy were as great as their propaganda said they were.”

”Japan's chauvinism was fed by the propagation of the idea of emperor worship and of the divinity of the Japanese islands and of the Japanese people.”

The author notes that, over the last half-century(1890-1940, roughly), Japan had been on the average in one war every ten years, and these wars were ones of aggression.

The author says the Japanese people began blaming the US for their failure to conquer China, while what they were doing in China was stirring up strong anti-Japanese feelings in the US.

Part of the Japanese misjudgment of the US willingness to fight was based on just how strong the US peace movement was, and how strong the isolationist movement was in the country. American industry was not really tooling up for war, there was a lot of labor strife, and no one in industry seemed interested in turning the industry to military use.

Their severely underestimated just how quickly the attitudes and actions of the US could change if given sufficient provocation.

The Japanese militarists were faced with a China war that was bogged down; they felt that their country was being encircled by various colonial powers; they felt the Axis powers in Europe would be victorious; they felt that the US was in no position to wage war, and they felt Russia would remain neutral to Japan. If there was any time to start a war, then this was it.

(What really happened: Germany and Italy lost; Russia eventually turned on Japan when it was to her own advantage; China continued to fight, and the US became a major war power and its industry a major factor in winning the war.)

Some of the factors that led to Japan being militarily aggressive included:

1. It's history of domination by a political oligarchy. In other words, a very small group of people were in position of power throughout its history. The actual people in power changed, but their numbers remained tiny.

2. The government for centuries had been in the hands of the military, either directly or indirectly.

3. The Japanese economy was also controlled by a very small group of people.

4. The institution of the Emperor had “played a dominant role inJapanese politics.”

5. Foreign influences had a great effect on Japan.

The book also covers some sections of the Japanese constitution (before it was revised after the end of the war).

Article I: “The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.” This emphasizes the mythology of Japan and helped the Japanese set themselves apart as a special peoples.

Article III: “The Emperor is sacred and inviolable.” This comes right out with a religious interpretation of the government. “

Article XI: “The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and Navy.” This has remained an extremely controversial topic; just how much influence did the Emperor actually have over the military? There is little doubt that a lot that was done in Manchuria was by an Army that was not under the control of anyone, really, much less the Emperor himself. As to things that happened during WWII, various books take opposing views over how much the Emperor actually knew about what was being done and how much influence he had, if any, over his military.

Article XXVIII: “Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief.” In other words, there was a guaranteed freedom of religion as long as the choice did not bother anyone in the government.

The book talks about the Japanese police at the time (more likely the thought police), and says they can arrest and detain for questioning anyone who is “suspected of being a spy, a communist, a free-lance plotter against the establishment order; a spreader of the 'wrong' ideas, or in any way suspected of threatening peace and order.”

”The record of unreasonable arrest, unjustified detention and torture, that the Japanese police have compiled, is as black as anything of its kind in the rest of the world.”

”The censorship function of the police has given them absolute control over every type of literature not only imported from abroad but also produced in Japan. Probably more editions of daily newspapers and more books and magazines have been suppressed in Japan by the police than in any other country.”

Main Index
Japan main page
Japanese-American Internment Camps index page
Japan and World War II index page