The Lost War: A Japanese Reporter's Inside Story (1946)

The author writes that the food situation in Japan was critical near the end of the war, but people were not outright starving; they were just malnourished. The problem is that the people who did heavy labor were malnourished also and so could not do their jobs efficiently. He writes that the Japanese government had no advance plans to handle food shortages.

”Japan's decision to attack the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands on December 8, 1941, was essentially a now or never decision. It was almost wholly an Army decision, and it represented the Army's best judgment as to the precise time at which the greatest opportunity for success might be expected.”

”The people of Japan, nevertheless, do not feel today any sense of responsibility for the war. Rather, they bitterly blame the leaders who led them into war. The conception of a people being responsible for its leaders is utterly foreign to a people who have been subjects of a 'divine ruler' for more than two thousand years.”

The Japanese put a lot of their hopes on Germany winning the war. Some apparently thought that Germany would defeat Russia by the end of 1942. This would have resulted in Germany being able to concentrate on defeating Great Britain, which the Japanese expected would surrender. At the same time, since Russia would no longer be a threat to Japan's interests in the Northern part of Aisa, then they could concentrate more of their efforts on defeating the Chinese.

The author says that information about the Dolittle raid was not widely published in Japan. “Had the raid been followed up immediately with others, it might have had an effect on shortening the war, but when the raiders failed to return, as Japanese leaders predicted they would fail, the real effort was to heighten domestic morale and to increase Japanese determination to resist all along the line.”

The author writes about the quote from Yamamoto about his taking the surrender of the US from the White House:

”If hostilities break out between Japan and the United States it would not be enough for us to take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. We should have to march into Washington and sign the treaty in the White House. I wonder if our politicians who speak so lightly of a Japanese-American war have confidence in the outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices?”

The author writes about the extreme degree of friction between the Japanese Army and the Japanese Navy over strategy and division of materials. “There is no doubt that a major portion of the responsibility for Japan's failure at Guadalcanal, Bougainville, the Gilbert Islands, and later at all-important Saipan may be traced to the failure of the Army and Navy to set aside their differences when the future of the nation was at state.”

In talking about the Japanese propaganda efforts, the author says that, for the first six months, the efforts were successful; this was due to the unbroken string of Japanese victories over that time period. The civilians trusted what the government said about battle results for about a year and a half after the start of the war. The Japanese headquarters did not announce the US landing on Guadalcanal until Nov. 16, 1942.

The author notes that domestic Japanese announcements about the war were “inconsistent, and they lacked the detail that made American news broadcasts plausible.”

Apparently, the announcements made by the Army did not always agree with those made by the Navy, which would just serve to confuse the civilians.

The author says that the balloon bombs was a program that they hoped would impress the Japanese people, but it didn't since the US had strict censorship over the news of the balloon bombs landing in the US and by the time the censorship was lifted their balloon bombing effort was pretty much over.

There apparently was a Japanese plan to bombard New York with rockets fired from submarines, but it was never technically achieved.

The “Tokyo Rose” broadcasts were meant as propaganda efforts, but for a long time they provided mainly music and little propaganda; more propaganda was added later, and the listening audience stopped listening. The Japanese also made use of prisoners-of-war making their own statements on the radio, usually just messages home.

There was a lot of efforts in the newspapers to get a “whispering campaign” going about American atrocities to help convince the Japanese people to fight if the homeland was invaded.

To some degree, what the Japanese were saying was true. The campaign included information on the treatment of American Indians by whites; information on the lynching of blacks, and emphasis on Hollywood's portrayal of gangsterism. This all helped to make the US look like a land of very uncivilized people. Once the US bombing raids shifted from military in nature to area bombing, even more propaganda was made about the death of innocent women and children.

”Throughout the war there was not a single mention of any atrocity by Japanese soldier. No soldier was punished in a public trial for an offense against the laws of war, and no officer was ever called to account publicly.”

The author says that the Hindus, the Indonensians and the Burmise were inspired with “the spirit of revolt” against their “white masters” after the Japanese overthrew the colonial rule of the Western powers.

The author writes about how Japanese shipping was being sunk faster than it could be replaced, and that one of the major errors of the military leadership was underestimating the ability of the US submarine fleet.

As far as the Japanese submarine fleet goes, most of it was used for carrying cargo, according to the author (and other authors, also).

The author talks about how students in schools were expected to “volunteer” for service in war factories and labor battalions.

”The Neighborhood Association was one of the most effective instruments, next to the police and Kempei Tai, by which the Government was able to obtain at least surface support for its policies.”

Neighborhood associations were, and still are, groups set up within neighborhoods to sort of coordinate what is going on there, plan festivals and get-togethers, etc. Perhaps our “civic associations” are somewhat similar to that, but barely. Anyhow, the leaders of these groups would be able to keep watch on the people in the neighborhood and look for any signs of those who might oppose government policies. It's actually a very effective system since it involves a limited number of people to be watched.

The author notes that the newspapers, during the war, were basically just mouthpieces of the government; they had been severely reduced in number and size and were subject to considerable censorship.

”All writers, artists and musicians were urged to join national-service groups through which instruction was given in what to write, paint, or compose to promote the national ideals.”

In writing about the kamikaze, he notes that not all were volunteers, and that some were drafted. He also says:

”Kami Kaze was part and parcel of the disregard of the military leaders for human life, a by-product both of Oriental philosophy and of the totalitarian concept.”

There were 141 elementary schools destroyed in the Tokyo air raids. Another 200 schools were damaged. Around 4000 schools were destroyed in Japan during the war.

The author stresses how important the air raids were in crippling Japan's war potential.

Some people will wonder why the Japanese fought so viciously in the war, and yet, when the American troops occupied Japan after the war, there was very little difficulty. The author believes that the Emperor's message to the people of Japan was critically important, as the Japanese had great respect for authority and he was, theoretically, the most important authority in the country.

He also says that there is a leftover from the feudal system, deeply inbred into the Japanese people, which is a “resignation to the inevitable.”

He also says that the conduct of the American soldiers was overall so positive that it had a positive impression on the Japanese.

He says that the Japanese clung to hope as long as they did at least partially because of the fact that Japan had never been defeated in a war. Another factor was the fanatical propaganda slogans like “One hundred million people die in honor.”

The end of the war is covered briefly. Blackouts were lifted four days after the surrender, and censorship of mail was ended. He also writes, though:

”During the first week after the surrender Special Attack Corps planes of the Navy appeared several times over the capital and dropped leaflets which urged: 'Don't surrender. Don't believe the Imperial rescript. This is a false document.'”

”Suicides by those who felt responsibility for defeat or for war guilt or who merely could not face the future for one reason or another were a daily occurrence.”

Something mentioned in this book that I haven't seen elsewhere was another positive thing about the occupation troops. Apparently they brought their own food with them and did not use “any of Japan's meager food supplies,” and this was another thing that raised people's opinion of the American soldiers.

This was in contrast with pre-occupation articles in newspapers that warned women not to wear “conspicious” clothing, not to go out in the evening, and, if in danger of being raped, to cry for help.

”In a matter of days after their arrival the Americans had laid an oil pipeline from Yokohama to Atsugi, a distance of about fifteen miles. Japanese troops easily might have taken a year to do the same job.”

That goes with stuff I read elsewhere about how skilled the American engineering was and how quickly they could construct and repair roads and runways, for example.

Main Index
Japan main page
Japanese-American Internment Camps index page
Japan and World War II index page