Japanese Resistance in America's Concentration Camps
Gary Y. Okhiro. Amerasia Jounal. Quotes from the paper will be in italics.
Right off the first thing I noticed was the use of the term 'concentration camps.' This is a term not used very often. Usually what is used in 'internment camps,' so by the use of the term 'concentration camps' it seems likely that the author has a particular bias in his writing.
writers have tended to minimize the importance of
Japanese resistance to white control, to treat instances of revolt as
sporadic and uncharacteristic, and to resort to either the pressure release
theory or the “pro-Fascist’’ trouble-making minority to
explain the anomalous (in their view] instances of open
resistance.
There is little doubt that, given what happened to those of Japanese ancestry in being removed from their homes on the West Coast without any formal charges or trials, and then relocated to the internment camps, that there would be a lot of confusion, depression and anger among the internees.
The first incidence of resistance that the author examines is the Poston camp strike in November of 1942.
The Poston strike and the Manzanar riot of 1942 have
traditionally been set in opposition to each other to illustrate the
variable nature of resistance and the different results obtained by
contrasting administrative handling of the crises. Generally the
Poston strike has been typified as a more “responsible” protest,
orderly and dealt with administrative restraint, while the
Manzanar riot, as the appellation suggests, has been seen as an
“irresponsible” protest responded to with administrative
intransigence and resulting in mob action and violence. WRA
accounts of these “incidents” provide adequate glimpses into
what transpired from the administration’s point of view. These
descriptions furnish us with two distinguishable types of
resistance.
Following the beating of a Kibei bachelor in Poston Unit I on
November 14, 1942, about fifty suspects were rounded up and
questioned by the security police. Two of these were detained for
further questioning for several days pending the arrival of the
FBI. Meanwhile the family and associates of these two Kibei
sought to organize opposition to the administration’s detention of
the men. On two successive days, the 17th and lath, delegations
from blocks representing the two men met with administration
officials protesting the men’s innocence and demanding their
release. These proved fruitless and a noon meeting was called on
the 18th, attracting a crowd estimated at about 2,500 in front of
the jail where the men were being held. At this meeting the
demand for the unconditional and immediate release of the two
prisoners was read to the people after which the acting project
director appeared to offer administration guarantees that the men
would be accorded justice under the law. Despite the
administration’s appeal for patience, the community council,
following popular opinion, drew up a resolution demanding the
immediate release of the accused and the dropping of the charges
against them completely. Following the administration’s rejection
of these demands, the community council, Issei Advisory Board
and block managers resigned en masse.
One important thing to notice is the terminology used. A 'strike' is nowhere near as negative a term as a 'riot,' and the exact terms used can predispose a person to take a particular view automatically. The strike involves people protesting something but they're probably justified in what they are protesting. A riot indicates a lawless action involving hoodlums and violence. The term used will also predispose the reader to what he believes he or she should be done about what happened. A strike can be negotiated; a riot cannot, for example.
At the negotiations to end the strike held on the 23rd and 24th of
November, it became clear that the resisters’ objectives had
expanded to include the internees’ right to self-determination.
These included: [a] the establishment of a Public Relations
Committee to settle all “personal reputations” disputes out of
court; (b) the prerogative of the people to hire and fire all internee
labor in the administrative personnel and other important
positions; and [c] the recognition of the legitimacy of the
Emergency Council and its ability to set up, within the framework
of WRA provisions, a City Planning Board which would create the
internees’ administrative, legislative and economic structures.
The white administration responded to the resisters’ demands by
dropping all charges against one of accused in the absence of
grounds for prosecution, by releasing the second prisoner pending
his trial which was to be held inside the camp, and by accepting
the Emergency Council’s demands for recognition and self-determination.
The internees were under great emotional strain with their uprooting and relocation. It seemed to them they had no say over anything, no control over anything. A strike, they knew, would have an effect on the camp as the internees themselves did the vast majority of the work in the camps. They were willing to talk the situation over. There were problems but eventually a solution was found. The releasing of the second prisoner wasn't that much of a compromise, technically, on the part of the administration since there was no way the prisoner would be escaping the camp and eventually standing trial or have the charges dismissed, but the fact he was released gave the impression (true or not, I don't know) that the administration was being reasonable once everything had been talked out.
The author then presents his own idea of the type of resistance that was displayed in Poston. Then he discusses what happened that lead to the Manzanar riot.
on December 5,1942, at Manzanar, a well-known JACL leader was
assaulted. One suspect was arrested for the beating and placed in
the jail at Independence, a nearby town.13 The next day, at a mass
meeting attended by about 3-4,000 people, demands were drawn
up to be presented to the project director by an appointed
delegation of five men. These demands included: (a) the
unconditional release of the accused; (b) an investigation by the
Spanish Consul into general conditions at Manzanar; and (c)
further action against the hospitalized JACL leader and the
rooting out of other suspected inu.
The committee of five, followed by a crowd of about 1,000
internees, marched toward the administration building to present
their demands to the director. There they were confronted by
military police armed with rifles, tear gas and machine guns. This
show of force had been arranged by the newly appointed director
in the event of camp revolt. The project director met with the
delegation, received the demands and walked among the people to
listen to their grievances following which he promised the
Negotiation Committee that the prisoner would be returned to
camp provided that the crowd would disperse and the Committee
thereafter resort to the established channels of appeal and call no
more mass meetings.
Notice the similarities and dissimilarities between this event and Poston. In both cases a violent even lead to the situation. In both cases the alleged perpetrator was caught and put in a jail. In both cases demands were to be presented to the administration including the release of the prisoner.
Here comes the major difference. At Poston everything remained relatively peaceful. At Manzanar, the protestors were met with fully armed military police. An inu (dog), a person who is thought to be a collaborator with the administration, was involved and the feelings against such a person could run very, very strong. The crowd broke up but reformed later.
Then all hell broke loose as the crowd was met with soldiers firing tear gas and bullets at them. Result? One dead, one dying, around a dozen others wounded. More inu ended up being beaten that night and a negotiating committee and various revolt leaders presented an ultimation to the administration, threatening more violence.
That was not the smartest thing to do. They knew full well that the soldiers were willing to open fire on a crowd. They also hopefully had enough presence of mind to understand that, in any fight, they were going to lose and lose big. The Army not only had soldiers but it also had tanks to back them up. The leaders of the riot were sent elsewhere along with their families. Again, there was no way rioters would ultimately win.
The author says that, in this case, the administration was intransigent in their approach to what was going on and this lead to the violence.
So what the author seems to be saying is that the type of resistance that arises has a great deal to do with how the camp administration reacted to the situation leading to the violence. Since this was relatively early in the internment process, I don't think that those likely to cause trouble had not yet been reassigned to Tule Lake which could have also led to trouble. Talking out a problem is the best thing. In this case, though, there was a situation where the people in the camps were prisoners, just like someone in prison. They had not committed any crime so there is no doubt some, if not many of them had a very negative view of any administration and, under those types of conditions, it would not be that unexpected for any kind of situation to led to some form of resistance. I also expect that enough people understood that no matter how much resistance they would display they would be remaining in one camp or another or in a jail and that must itself have depressed and frustrated some of the internees.
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