A Torch to the Enemy

In this 1960 book the author takes an interesting look at the firebombing of Japan. He starts off by noting that the Japanese military “...did not realize that because American industry was never a target of their plans, they had already lost the war.” This is something that has been brought up by other authors over time; the Japanese for some reason refused to understand that, unless they were able to cripple American industry, they had no chance, in the long run, of winning a war with the US. The author goes on to say that the military leaders in Japan did not believe that their cities would ever be subject to direct attack by US forces, a mistake that cost them dearly.

Something which I have not encountered elsewhere: “The two atomic bombs contributed less than 3 percent of the destruction visited upon the industrial centers of Japan.”

The author writes that the war against Japan was considered of secondary importance to the war against Germany, and that it would be mainly a defensive war until Germany was defeated.

Tokyo was a target of the firebombing because it was both a military target and a psychological target. Hitting the capital of the nation would raise the morale of Americans and, hopefully, lower the morale of the Japanese.

He goes on to note that the main aircraft production was concentrated in so few cities that it was very vulnerable to attack.

The author also examines the difference between German and Japanese cities, noting that German cities were mainly concrete and steel buildings and, thus, would need explosive bombs to damage them. Japanese cities, on the other hand, were primarily wood and paper and were very vulerable to fire damage, far more than German cities.

The author notes that there were many Japanese homes that were used to produce pieces of war material. “...it exposes for the lie it truly is the contention that this was mass warfare against innocent civilians who were making no contribution to Japan's ability to continue it's fight.” Thus, in this line of reasoning, the civilian homes were legitimate targets, and if you could destroy enough of them you could cripple Japanese military industrial capability.

There is also some material in the book about Japanese war atrocities in relation to how they treated prisoners.

He notes that the Japanese had not planned on incendiary raids, and did not realize that the numerous small fires started by the bombs would unite and become huge fires, and that many people would be trapped in them. He also writes about how the fire departments were not prepared for such attacks. They had also not anticipated losing such a major portion of their air forces much less anticipated that their home islands would come under direct attack.

The author includes material on the kamikazes.

In the firebombing of Tokyo, the author says that the B-29s flying at five thousand feet ran into tremendous thermal updrafts created by the fires, updrafts so powerful they were able to throw the B-29's around. The few Japanese planes that were in the air could not attack the B-29s since their small planes were affected so badly by the updrafts that they could not control the planes much less mount any kind of a defensive effort.

There is a lot of description of the attacks on Tokyo and in quite specific detail, including how people died. The material is quite upsetting and I simply won't cover it here.

The author has a small section on the other cities attacked, noting that, by the end of the attacks, up to four cities a night were being gutted since smaller cities were being attacked, the bigger cities having sustained all the damage that could be effectively dealt them.

This is a well done book, it's a good book, but it is also an upsetting book in parts and may not be suitable for the more sensitive reader.

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