Unconditional Defeat: Japan, America, and the End of World War II

2004

Again, as with other books, I'll just highlight a few points.

One good example of showing just how much someone can be totally clueless is given in the book. On December 27, 1943, a time when the forces of Japan were being pushed back, Tojo said “the real war is just beginning.” What was he counting the last decade plus, from 1931 on (with the invasion of China).

The book does discuss one of the fundamental reasons Japan lost the war; the ability of the US to continue producing materials. Since Japan was unable to effectively do anything to stop US production, the country was able to produce the food and weapons needed to carry on the war.

By March of 1945, students from upper elementary school up were removed from schools and put to work in the war effort (doing such things as making firebreaks, manning telephone lines, keeping track of bombers approaching, etc.) The problem, for Japan, was that, although more people were being put to work, total productivity was down.

The regular skilled workers had largely been drafted into the army, and simply replacing one physical body with another does not guarantee quality work. The students, women, and other untrained people were simply not capable of doing the work the full-time workers had been doing, so productivity and quality both declined.

Malnutrition became more and more of a problem as the war went on for Japan. The average caloric intake for a male was supposed to be 2,400 calories, but by 1945 the amount the average male was getting was 1,793 calories per day (and I assume women and children were in the same boat).

As Japan lost more and more territory, the oil they needed was lost to them. In 1942 then imported 40% of their oil from conquered territories; by 1944 that figure dropped to 5%.

”American troops simply overwhelmed the Japanese with quantities of industrial and technological goods. ... in 1944 U.S.industries produced 26 tons of explosives for every ton made in Japan, and the next year the ratio jumped to 61 to 1.”

The book also dealt with other materials, as to how much was produced by the two countries from 1939 through 1945. The US produced 35 times the tanks and self-propelled guns that Japan did; 19 times the artillery; 7 times the machine guns; over 4 times the number of fighter aircraft; 8 times the number of aircraft carriers, and so on.

As to conditions in 1944, the book says: “The nation [Japan] was overpowered decisively on the seas, as well as on land and in the air, and as thousands of tons of shipping went to the bottom, it was no longer able to mobilize sufficiently its industry, finances, and trade. Japan was also losing the appeal to Asians to fight against the West, and its military was faltering in Burma and China. In short, the empire was essentially helpless to fend off the United States.”

The book also talks about the decision to use or not use the atomic bomb. Truman had to consider isolation and blockade of Japan; bombardment and continued mining and aerial bombing of Japan; an actual invasion of the home islands, or the use of the atomic bomb. The book says “...he was ..sickened and horrified by the Japanese will to barbarism and fatalism.” He wanted to save US lives, and the atomic bomb seemed to be the best way to do that, to end the war as soon as possible.

The book refers to the number of expected casualties in Operation Olympic and Operation Coronet as ranging from 250,000 to 500,000. The invasion of Japan would be more deadly than the invasion of France. The Japanese also had the idea of “The Glorious Death of One Hundred Million.” If the Japanese fought as hard as they did on Okinawa, and if the civilians really did answer the call for “one person, one body”, then it's quite possible the casualties for the US would have been very high.

The use of the atomic bomb in relation to the Soviet Union and post-war plans is also discussed. If the war could be ended quickly, it would prevent the Soviet Union from taking part of Japan and ending up with a situation like Berlin had.

”It is clear that no American at the time would lament the devastation of Japan. Imperial forces had a gruesome record of mistreatment of prisoners, involving death marches, experimental surgery, fatal slave labor, massacres of incarcerated combatants and indigenous people, and such perverse acts as cannibalism and crucifixions. Biological testing on adults and children, and forced prostitution, shocked the public. The Japanese had also engaged in the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of people throughout Asia, in addition to having maintained a sustained, punishing defense against the Allies.”

”The vicious Pacific war, in which racial prejudices intensified the will to kill, made rational thinking regarding alternatives to the bomb e xtremely difficult. Americans were clear about one thing: the Japanese politicians and militarists were the savages. Their ice-cold, fanatical, and systematically barbaric behavior required their total destruction by US troops, and America had the technological and industrial wherewithal to bring this about.”

Keep in mind that anti-Oriental prejudice was not something new to the US at all; it dated back over half a century to the time of the Chinese immigration to the US, which resulted in the Oriental Exclusion Laws. During the war, the general anti-Oriental prejudice shifted to the Japanese, with the Chinese suddenly seen as sympathetic.

A US strategic bombing survey showed that Japan could “not have sustained itself” past November of 1945 due to the lack of raw materials. The upcoming winter would have seen mass starvation in the country.

During the war, the US lost 167 warships; Japan lost 402. The US lost 1,699 planes; the Japanese at lost at least 38,105 planes, over 22 times as many as the US. With the lack of raw materials, unskilled labor, and constant US bombing, Japan was totally unable to replace their losses much less keep up with the US arms buildup.

During the war about 2.7 million Japanese died, civilians and military alike. Between 9 and 15 million Chinese died. 16% of the Japanese navy were casualties, and 20% of their Army. American loses during the entire war (counting Europe), were 40,400 dead, and 670,800 wounded.

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