Analysis of Pre-invasion Air Operations, Pacific Area, November-December 1943

The reports starts off by saying that, in the autumn of 1943, Japanese forces in the Pacific were on the defense. “No offensive action was possible for the Imperial Army so long as the navy was on the defensive.”

“...their aircraft factories were turning out fighters and bombers faster than ever before...but this production could never match that of the United States.”

“Japan had begun the war with a small group of highly skilled pilots, but practically all of those had been thrown into the fighting. Some losses had been incurred while victories were being won in the earlier campaigns, and then had come the disastrous loss of pilots in the Coral Sea and at Midway, making it necessary to train new airmen for the carriers. In the meantime, attrition in other areas, New Guinea particularly, had skimmed off the cream of Japanese army pilots. By autumn of 1943, good pilots were definitely in short supply. ...The number and skill of Japanese pilots was constantly decreasing while the number and skill of their adversaries was increasing.”

“...in was also evident by late 1943 that Japanese aircraft were inferior to those they met in battle.”

“Moreover, the Americans held to formations from which they could support one another-when a Japanese pilot succeeded in getting in position to fire on an American plane, he was all too often shot down before he culd use his advantage. To add to the enemy pilot's troubles, he had no armor to protect him from enemy fire, and his aircraft was prone to break to pieces, explode, or burn when hit.”

In relation to the Gilbert Islands: they are an irregular triangle in shape. The Japanese put up their defenses on Betic Island, which was the westernmost of those on the southern side of the triangle. They built an airstrip in the center of the island. The island had “formidable” defenses.

In relation to Cape Gloucester: it is on the northwestern tip of New Britain Island. The Japanese force on the island was the 65th Independent Brigade.

Pre-invasion bombardment of Betic Island was “insufficient in quantity and poorly executed.”

“The bombs dropped by land-based and carrier-based planes alike were either too few in number or too light inweight to accomplish the desired destruction.”

In relation to Cape Gloucester, “strikes directed at supplies and supply lines were probably the most successful part of the pre-invasion air attacks.”

“The shortage of food lowered the vitality of the Japanese and made them more susceptible to the diseases so prevalent in the jungle.”

There were thre days of fighting at Tarawa. The 2nd Marine Division had 3,000 casualties, of which 980 were killed. The 1st Marine Division lost 303 men killed and more than 1,000 wounded.

“The operation revealed that naval gunfire was not nearly so destructive of Japanese positions as had been expected. ... Japanese fortifications of the type found on Tarawa could withstand far more shellfire than had been imagined.”

In relation to Iwo Jima: “Iwo Jima, for the number of men engaged, was the scene of the bloodiest fighting of the Pacific War. ... In part, however, the long casualty roll suffered by the Marines at Iwo Jima resulted from disregard for the lessons taught by previous operations. The same situation prevailed when the Marines went ashore on Iwo Jima that had obtained almost exactly 15 months earlier when the assault was made at Tarawa. the Japanese defensive installations were largely intact, and they took a terrible toll of the men on the beaches soon after the landing began.”

The author says that the bombs used on Iwo Jima were not heavy enough to do sufficient damage to the Japanese defenses.



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