Five Days in August

The book's author holds that the argument over military justification for the use of the atomic bomb is not significant. “Because so many military planners and influential politicians considered the atomic bomb to be, at least in some degree, an “ordinary” weapon-certainly special, even unique, in some senses, but decidedly not in the senses we appreciate today-dropping one or several of them merited no more justification than the inception of firebombing campaigns, napalm, or other local decisions made largely in the field; that is, little to no justification.”

In other words, the atomic bomb was just another weapon, so no “justification” of its use was necessary at all.

The author also says that the U.S. did not really expect Japan to surrender as suddenly as it did.

The author says a third bomb was in the process of being assembled, and would have been dropped, probably on Tokyo, on August 19th. v

The atomic bomb was not initially a “shock” weapon; it ended up being that way simply through the timing of the surrender.

Some feel that nuclear bombing and firebombing were not really that different. General Curtis LeMay: “Nothing new about death, nothing new about deaths caused militarily. We scorched and boiled and baked to death more people in Tokyo on that night of March 9-10 [1945] than went up in vapor at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.”

The author notes that, in some respects, the atomic bomb was just another “special” weapon, like the V-1, the V-2, and the kamikaze, that was expected to “turn the tide” in the war. This contrasted with another view of the bomb, that it s just another weapon and, like any other weapon, would be used when needed.

The book then discusses the 17 initial targets, and how they were whittled down to 5. According to production schedules, 3 more atomic bombs would have been ready in September of 1945, and at least 7 more in December of that year. The author says that military people at that time figured several or even many atomic bombs might be necessary to get Japan to surrender.

There was a considerable lack of concern in the military about radiation from the bombs. Tokyo Rose made a broadcast about people getting ill (from the effects of radiation), but some of those involved her thought she was not telling the truth.



Main Index
Japan main page
Japanese-American Internment Camps index page
Japan and World War II index page