Details of the Campaign Against Japan. JWPC 369/1, 15 June 1945.
This is the JWPC's response to the JPS request for a draft reply to Admiral Leahy's memo of 14 June.
Upon receiving this document, the JPS made some modifications and submitted it to the Chiefs as
JCS 1388. The JPS revisions in document 5 included deletions that has BEEN marked with brackets;
the most noteworthy of these are marked on pages 7 and 9. This is an especially important document
because it demonstrates the military planners' sensitivity about confronting the President over casualty
estimates. It does give a total estimate of roughly "a quarter of a million," which was consistent with the
casualty data used by the staffs of both MacArthur and Nimitz.
First, this portion of the document sticks with the “unconditional surrender” demand by the U.S. government. Many of the Japanese assumed that this meant that the Emperor would be removed from power, perhaps tried, even executed, as a war criminal, and this was something that they did not want to see happen.
To get the Japanese to agree to this, the U.S. proposed air and sea blockades of Japan, destroying Japanese air and sea abilities, and invading and seizing areas in the Japanese heartland.
It also notes that it is possible that sections of the Japanese military on the various islands, etc, would refuse to surrender even if the central government surrendered, so it was possible that, even if Japan itself surrendered, fighting against these isolated (and usually bypassed) groups would have to continue.
After Okinawa, Kyushu would be attacked, and the Tokyo Plain after that.
Everything centers around eventually taking over the Tokyo Plain, which includes Tokyo, of course. This is all based on the assumption that things involve the military, mainly. If the civilian population resisted the U.S. forces as fiercely as some think it would have, seizing the Tokyo Plain would not have been enough; virtually all of Japan would have to be taken.
Although there were no specific, detailed plans (supposedly) for the attack on the Tokyo Plain, the date for the invasion was set for around March 1 of 1946. Increased bombing of Japan would be taking place (probably firebombing), and the blockade would be tightened.
The northwestern portion of Kyushu was not going to be a major center of attack, apparently, although it could become that if necessary. The U.S. would have built lots of airfields in Kyushu, and used those to increase the intensity of the bombing of Japanese cities.
The reason that southern Kyushu would be attacked included the belief that taking it would help cut lines of communication between Japanese forces in Japan and in Korea and mainland Asia. It also seemed the most logical step based on the things that had already been done and the areas attacked.
Other reasons again relate to airfields, plus it would make it easier to attack the Japanese army itself.
This portion of the document says that the casualties cannot be accurately estimated, this even though other documents set specific numbers of possible casualties. There simply was no way to be absolutely sure. No one knew just how bad the kamikaze attack would be (probably worse than expected since they had more planes left than the U.S. thought they had), and there was no way to tell how many civilians would take up arms against the U.S. forces.
This examines the concept of casualties. It has some conclusions:
1. The highest casualty rate occurs during the assault phase.
2. The number of casualties depends on how long the fighting goes on, and how strongly the enemy resists.
3. The number of casualties can be held down by ending the war as soon as possible.
4. The number of casualties can be held down by not having a large number of assaults.
(Aren't these brilliant? How many hours did it take the guys to come up with these fantastic ideas? The sooner the war is over, the sooner people stop being killed. Wow. It must have taken a genius to come up with that.)
The document goes on to talk about surprise as to landing areas, yet the Japanese knew full well just where the U.S. was going to land, on what beaches, and pretty much when. The document then comes up with its own casualty expectations.
The document figures that the fighting would end around the middle of 1946, which would have added around ten months to the length of the war. Or, the document points out, it could take till the end of 1946. Or, it could take longer, and all of this would be done while other nations were taking the time to recover from the effects of the war and rebuild their economies.
The strength of Japanese forces in certain areas.
More on Japanese resistance strength.
Why it was not a good idea to attack Northwest Kyushu.
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