"The two services also disagreed over Pacific strategy. General MacArthur argued that Allied forces already deployed in the Southwest Pacific Area (notably Australia) should undertake an offensive toward the Philippine Islands. In turn, Navy strategists called for a major offensive through the island chains of the Central Pacific Area, as had been called for in prewar iterations of War Plan ORANGE. Perhaps inevitably, the question of Pacific strategy was resolved through a series of compromises as each theater undertook its own
offensive.”
”In the South and Southwest Pacific Areas, the port of Rabaul on the island of New Britain in the Bismarck Archipelago blocked any American offensive toward the Philippines or Japan. The bulwark of Japanese defenses in the area, Rabaul was fortified with a large garrison and a network of air bases that protected Japanese warships and merchant vessels in its great natural harbor. The Joint Chiefs had issued orders on 2 July 1942 directing the forces of the South Pacific Area (SPA) and SWPA “to begin the advance toward Rabaul.” The
directive called for a three-task process. Task One had been completed with the American victory in Guadalcanal (carried out under the SPA commander). Task Two was the capture of portions of northeast New
Guinea and the remainder of the Solomons. Task Three was the seizure of Rabaul. Tasks Two and Three were to be achieved by SPA and SWPA forces under MacArthur’s overall command.”
A typical Japanese pillbox. (DA photograph)
There's more in the booklet, but those were the parts I found most interesting.
Main Index
Japan main page
Japanese-American Internment Camps index page
Japan and World War II index page
