ISOLATION OF RABAUL: History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II

Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps 1963

The Japanese bit off more than they could chew

“The natural clairvoyance of hindsight similarly aided a number of enemy officers to recognize the fact that Japan had overextended herself by early spring of 1942. At that time, however, the headquarters faction that had authored the original ambitious war plan was still in the saddle and their aggressive philosophy prevailed. Orders went out from Tokyo to continue the advance, to seize further positions that would shield the initial perimeter. It was this decision more than any other taken by Imperial Headquarters during the course of the war that hastened the downfall of the Japanese Empire. In less than a year's time, enemy forces were reeling back all across the Pacific, and the reserves that would have bolstered the original perimeter were dissipated in a fruitless effort to continue the offensive.”

They tended to overlook the fact that the more area you take over, the more area you have to protect and the longer your supply lines become. This became very critical when U.S. submarines managed to sink a large portion of the Japanese merchant fleet, making reinforcing the groups that were left difficult if not impossible for them later in the war.

“The new expansionist plans called for the occupation of strategic islands, suitable for air and naval base development, in the North, Central, and South Pacific. The grand prize sought was Midway; it was hoped that a thrust there would bring out the American fleet for a decisive engagement.”

The Japanese kept doggedly on the idea of a “decisive engagement.” Every time there idea didn't work, they brought up the idea of another “decisive engagement,” although this one was bound to be closer to Japan proper. They never seemed to give up on that idea, and it was an idea that never worked.

“Closely linked to this projected attack was the movement of an occupation force into the Aleutians to seize Kiska, Attu, and Adak Islands. The two operations would be conducted simultaneously, and both enemy supporting fleets would be available to combine against, the American ships. In the south, the objective was to strengthen the Japanese position in the Bismarcks and on New Guinea. Plans were laid to take Port Moresby in southeastern New Guinea and to move outpost garrisons into the Solomons. After the successful conclusion of the Midway operation, the Japanese planned to move against New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa, and sever Australia's lifeline to the States. The enemy timetable for expansion listed the seizure of Port Moresby for early May, followed in a month's time by the attack on Midway. In both cases the carefully selected occupation troops never got a chance to set foot on their objectives. Seen in retrospect, the issue was decided at sea, and the decision was final.”

Rabaul

Bouganville

Bouganville

A Japanese VAL bomber

Japanese planes and pilot training

“ In April 1943, after 16 months of heavy fighting, the total strength stood at 2)980, which meant that the manufacturers had been able to do little more than keep pace with combat and operational losses. In the succeeding year, the production rate nearly doubled, but losses soared also; there were 6,598 planes on hand in April 1944, but the standard of construction had deteriorated badly.”

In another document I found the numbers of planes produced, which continued to climb through 1944, but that particular document didn't make any mention of the rather sorry construction standards being used late in the war.

“Even more serious than the sag in the quality of naval aircraft maintenance and production was the steady attrition of experienced flight personnel. The pilots who began the war averaged 800 hours of flying time, and many of them had combat experience in China. Relatively few of these men survived until the end of 1943; a great many died at Coral Sea and Midway and in air battles over Guadalcanal. Others crashed trying to stretch the limited range of Vals and Kates to cover the long stretch between Rabaul and Guadalcanal. The replacements, pilots and aircrews alike, could not hope to match the worth of the men whose places they took. Two years of flight training and practice had been the prewar requisite to make a man a qualified naval pilot or "observer" (bombardiers, navigators, and gunners). In 1941, the training time was cut about in half. Pilots spent about 60 hours in primary and intermediate trainers, observers spent 44, both in a six-month period. F1ight training in combat types, spread over a four-to-six month period, was 100 hours for pilots and 60 hours for observers. Thereafter, 150 hours of tactical flight training was programmed for men in the units to which they were assigned. At Rabaul, however, this phase was spent in combat, and those few who survived 150 hours could count themselves as living on borrowed time.”

Thus, late in the war, the U.S. was producing more planes and better pilots, both. The Japanese produced more planes but of lower quality, and the pilots they produced simply didn't have the training necessary. This is another reason that so many of them ended up as kamikaze pilots.

“Japanese naval flyer who fought at Rabaul was aware that he was waging a losing battle. The plane he flew was a torch, waiting only an incendiary bullet to set it alight. The gaping holes in his unit left by the death of veterans were filled by young, inexperienced replacements, more a liability than an asset in combat air operations. Despite the handicaps under which he fought—out-numbered, outgunned, out-flown—the enemy flyers fought, tenaciously right up to the day when Rabaul was abandoned to its ground defenders.”

I saw a program on TV about the plane construction, and there was a major difference between the U.S. and Japanese planes. For one thing, the American planes had more armor and could stand up better to being shot at. The second thing related to the fuel tanks. I don't understand all the technical details, but the fuel tanks of the Japanese planes were easy to explode when shot, while the fuel tanks of the U.S. planes weren't.

Capturing a Japanese Zero

“One of the more significant events in the history of the air war in the Pacific was a crash landing on 3 June 1942 from which the plane emerged virtually intact. The pilot, a Japanese petty officer, was less fortunate and broke his neck. The plane, a Zero, had had its fuel line punctured by antiaircraft fire during a raid on the U.S. naval base at Dutch Harbor. ... Returned to the States with careful haste, the plane was completely disassembled by engineers and technicians and rebuilt in its original undamaged condition ready for flight test. ...the Zeke was skillfully flown against major American fighter aircraft to measure comparative. performance and to fathom the Japanese plane's weaknesses.”

At the start of the war, the Zeke/Zero was able to outfight the U.S. planes since it was a better plane. Finding one intact was a valuable intelligence coup.

“The response to these findings was twofold, to accelerate production of new American fighters that could clearly outclass the Zeke, and to emphasize aerial combat tactics that took full advantage of the Japanese plane's limitations.”

Attacking Rabaul

Drone Bombs

“During September and October, one spectacular new air weapon, a drone bomb, was tested against Japanese targets in the AirNorSols area. The drones, specially built planes capable of carrying a 2,000- pound bomb, were radio controlled by torpedo bombers of a special naval test unit. Synchronized television screens in drone and control planes enabled the controllers to view what was ahead of the drones and to crash them against point targets. After test attacks on a ship hulk beached at Guadalcanal, the test unit moved up to Stirling and Green and made 47 sorties in conjunction with F4LTs, SBDS, and PBJs. The results were inconclusive. Two of the pilotless bombs were lost en route to targets because of radio interference, mechanical defects caused five crashes, Japanese antiaircraft shot down three, and five drones had television failures and could not locate a target. Of those drones that did attack, 18 hit their objective and 11 missed or near missed. shortly after completing its last”

The science of the day was not advanced enough to get these things to do what was wanted of them. In today's world, such things are fairly common and very effective.



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