PEARL HARBOR: FAILURE OF INTELLIGENCE?
1997
The following are all direct quotes from the report, except for the last couple of lines.
Why were the American forces in Hawaii so unprepared for the Japanese attack? No fewer than nine Congressional and military investigations, as well as the efforts of numerous scholars and historians, have attempted to answer this question. The official answer, according to the United States
Senate and House of Representatives’ Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack/Report of
the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, dated 16 July 1946,
states that:
The disaster of Pearl Harbor was the failure, with attendant increase in
personnel and material losses, of the Army and the Navy [to] institute
measures designed to detect an approaching hostile force, to effect a state
of readiness commensurate with the realization that war was at hand, and
to employ every facility at their command in repelling the Japanese.
Virtually everyone was surprised that Japan struck the Fleet at Pearl
Harbor at the time that she did. Yet officers, both in Washington and
Hawaii, were fully conscious of the danger from air attack; they realized
this form of attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan was at least a possibility; and
they were adequately informed of the imminence of war.
Specifically, the Hawaiian commands failed
(a) To discharge their responsibilities in the light of the warnings received
from Washington, other information possessed by them, and the principle
of command by mutual cooperation.
(b) To integrate and coordinate their facilities for defense and to alert
properly the Army and Navy establishments in Hawaii particularly in the
light of the warnings and intelligence available to them during the period
November 27 to December 7, 1941.
(c) To effect liaison on a basis designed to acquaint each of them with the
operations of the other, which was necessary to their joint security, and to
exchange fully all significant intelligence.
(d) To maintain a more effective reconnaissance within the limits of their
equipment.
(e) To effect a state of readiness throughout the Army and Navy
establishments designed to meet all possible attacks.
(f) To employ the facilities, materiel, and personnel at their command,
which were adequate at least to have greatly minimized the effects of the
attack, in repelling the Japanese raiders.
(g) To appreciate the significance of intelligence and other information
available to them.
The errors made by the Hawaiian commands were errors of judgment and
not derelictions of duty.
The War Plans Division of the War Department failed to discharge its
direct responsibility to advise the commanding general he had not properly
alerted the Hawaiian Department when the latter, pursuant to instructions,
had reported action taken in a message that was not satisfactorily
responsive to the original directive.
Notwithstanding the fact that there were officers on twenty-four hour
watch, the Committee believes that under all of the evidence the War and
Navy Departments were not sufficiently alerted on December 6 and 7,
1941, in view of the imminence of war.
Despite the overwhelming amount of evidence supporting these conclusions, they are
often disbelieved or ignored. Some scholars and historians, to include a textbook used at
the Air War College, continue to assert that the disaster at Pearl Harbor was really a
“major failure of American intelligence.” They incorrectly assert that: the American
intelligence community had the capability and sufficient information to determine
Japanese intentions to attack Pearl Harbor; and subsequently failed to evaluate, analyze,
and disseminate intelligence in a timely manner to the national command authorities, the
War and Navy Departments, and Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Lieutenant General
Walter C. Short in Hawaii.
There is no question that the intelligence community shared part of the blame for
Pearl Harbor. The United States Senate and House of Representatives’ Investigation of
the Pearl Harbor Attack/Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl
Harbor Attack, dated 16 July 1946, correctly stated that:
The Intelligence and War Plans Divisions of the War and Navy
Departments failed:
(a) To give careful and thoughtful consideration to the intercepted
messages from Tokyo to Honolulu of September 24, November 15, and
November 20 (the harbor berthing plan and related dispatches) and to raise
a question as to their significance. Since they indicated a particular interest
in the Pacific Fleet’s base this intelligence should have been appreciated
and supplied the Hawaiian commanders for their assistance, along with
other information available to them, in making their estimate of the
situation.
(b) To be properly on the qui vive to receive the “one o’clock” intercept
and to recognize in the message the fact that some Japanese military action
would very possibly occur somewhere at 1 p. m., December 7. If properly
appreciated, this intelligence should have suggested a dispatch to all
Pacific outpost commanders supplying this information, as General
Marshall attempted to do immediately upon seeing it.
But these shortcomings did not, and do not, represent a “major failure of American
intelligence.” They are contributing factors to be certain, but not the sole or most
important in the surprise achieved by the Japanese attack. Intelligence adequate to
determine that Japan would probably initiate hostilities on or about December 7, 1941,
was provided to American government and military leaders. In addition, key officers
within the Navy Department rejected requests from the intelligence staff to forward
information to the military commanders in Hawaii. The root of the problem lay with the
attitude held by key national and military decision-makers concerning the utility of
intelligence. A review of the history of the U.S. intelligence community prior to the
attack; its intelligence collection capabilities; the success of the collection effort; what
was known of Japanese military preparations for offensive activity; and how that
information was utilized by national and military decision-makers shows that Pearl
Harbor was not a failure of intelligence, but stemmed from flawed command
relationships and inadequate leadership.
The report goes into the history of the intelligence community and some other topics, but I thought the above part was the most interesting.
Main Index
Japan main page
Japanese-American Internment Camps index page
Japan and World War II index page
|